To Codify or Not to Codify - That Is the Question: A Study of New York\u27s Efforts to Enact an Evidence Code by Salken, Barbara C.
Pace Law Review
Volume 17
Issue 3 Tribute 1997
Celebrating the Life of Barbara C. Salken
Article 17
June 1997
To Codify or Not to Codify - That Is the Question:
A Study of New York's Efforts to Enact an Evidence
Code
Barbara C. Salken
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Barbara C. Salken, To Codify or Not to Codify - That Is the Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to
Enact an Evidence Code, 17 Pace L. Rev. 171 (1997)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
[Reprinted with Permission from Brooklyn Law
Review, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 641 (1992). Citations
appear as they do in the Original.]
To Codify or Not to Codify-That Is the
Question: A Study of New York's Efforts to
Enact an Evidence Code
Barbara C. Salken*
Introduction
New York State's law of evidence continues to be governed
largely by cases, despite codification efforts dating back almost
150 years. Complete codes of evidence have been proposed on
six different occasions. The failure of New York, once the leader
in codification of the common law,1 to enact an evidence code is
particularly surprising in light of the momentum toward codifi-
cation that began with the enactment of the Federal Rules of
Evidence in 1975 and resulted in the codification of evidence
law in all but six sister states.2
* Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A., Skidmore College, 1969; J.D.,
Brooklyn Law School, 1975. .
My thanks to Professors Donald L. Doernberg, Bennett L. Gershman, Ran-
dolph N. Jonakait and Robert M. Pitler for their helpful suggestions on an earlier
draft, to my husband, Matthew J. Rosen, Esq. and Professor Lisa Griffin for their
editorial assistance, and to my research assistants, Rachelle Congemi, Jennifer
Larraguibel and Linda Loving for their hard work.
1. See infra notes 46-73 and accompanying text.
2. Besides New York, Connecticut, illinois, Indiana, Maryland, Massachu-
setts and Virginia are the only remaining states without evidence codes. Connecti-
cut is now considering codification of its law of evidence. State Senator Anthony V.
Avallone, Co-chair of the Connecticut General Assembly's Judiciary Committee,
has ordered the Connecticut Law Revision Commission to study the feasibility of
enacting a state evidence code. Joseph Calve, Evidentiary Circumstance, CONN. L.
'fum., Dec. 2, 1991, at 13.
Thirty-four states have codified their law of evidence modeled on the Federal
Rules of Evidence. See infra note 124. Four states have codes that pre-date the
Federal Rules: ALA.. CODE §§ 12-21-1 to -285 (1986 & Supp. 1992); CAL. EVlD. CODE
§§ 1-1605 (West 1996 & Supp. 1992); RAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to -470 (1985 &
Supp. 1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-l to -49 (West 1976 & Supp. 1992). Five
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In 1992, the New York legislature again considered an evi-
dence code. Drafted in 1990, and repeatedly modified to meet
political opposition, the current proposal was designed merely
to codify current New York common law.3 Yet, even this con-
servative approach failed.
Why has it so difficult for the New York legislature to enact
a code of evidence? This Article attempts to answer that ques-
tion and examines the arguments advanced on both sides of the
issue. Part I traces the long history of the codification move-
ment. Part II examines the current debate. In general, sup-
porters of codification argue that New York's common law of
evidence is difficult to discover and hard to understand. They
assert that it is applied differently in different courtrooms, is
antiquated and is ripe for reform. Opponents argue that the
present system is working well and should not be disturbed.
They fear that codification will freeze the development of the
law or, worse, subject it to the political process. Identification of
the supporters of codification and its opponents discloses a sur-
prising alliance of adversaries. Regardless of their specialty,
those members of the bar generally having the burden of proof,
both civil and criminal, enthusiastically support codification
while the defense bar aggressively, and so far successfully, op-
poses it.
Part II also discusses the merits of each side's arguments.
The result of this examination suggests that the real conflict is
between those who would benefit from the modern trend to lib-
eralize the admission of evidence, and those who not only op-
pose that trend, but fear placing decision-making power in the
legislature. New York has been unable to codify its law of evi-
dence because the defense bar, particularly the criminal defense
bar, does not believe that the legislature will protect its inter-
ests. As with so much else in our society, the question of
whether to codify the law of evidence has become a question of
power and trust. This Article concludes that codification can
states have modern codes that are not based on the federal model: GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 24-1-1 to -154 (Michie 1982 & Supp. 1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 422.010-990.
(MichieJBobbs-Merrill 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 490.010-710 (1986 & Supp. 1992);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 42, § 6101 (1982 & Supp. 1992); and S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 19-1-10
to -70 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1991).
3. NEW YORK STATE LAW REVISION COMMISSION, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR THE
STATE OF NEW YORK XVIII (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Proposed N.YC.E.].
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make the law more accessible, clarify ambiguities and permit
reform and modernization. But since codification requires legis-
lative action, with its possible political consequences, it cannot
be strikingly innovative. Codification will not prevent change
but will shift the forum for change. The courts' role in develop-
ing law will be more limited and the legislature's role will be
more important. There is little evidence to support opponents'
fears that codification will make the law of evidence a political
football. In the end, the quality of New York's evidence law will
be improved with codification.
1. Historical Roots of Codification
Codification is the process by which the whole of a body of
law, be it case law or statutory law, is converted into systematic
form by legislative or executive act. 4 The current effort to codify
New York's law of evidence is merely the latest in a long history
of attempts to consolidate and simplify complex bodies of law.
The arguments in this debate have their roots in the ancient
controversy over whether law should be made by judges or
legislators.
A. The European Beginnings
Codification began in France in the early 1800s. France's
successful and popular codification movement grew out of the
chaotic state of its law and became a model for reform.5 The
need for uniformity and simplicity could not have been greater:
at the time of the French Revolution, there were at least 360
local codes of civil law. In addition, there were two distinct sys-
tems oflaw in the country; the written law, based on the Roman
law, and a substantial body of customary law.6 Each had its
own distinctive features. The written law, which predominated
in the North, was authoritative and individualistic while the
customary law, which predominated in the South, was more hu-
mane and flexible. 7 Making matters worse, both of these sys-
4. CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 513 (William S. Hein
& Co. 1980) (1911). See also COURTENAY ILBERT, THE MECHANICS OF LAw MAKING
150 (1914).
5. ILBERT, supra note 4, at 153.
6. [d. at 156.
7. [d.
3
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terns were supplemented, modified or contradicted by three
other general systems: feudal law, canon law and royal ordi-
nances.8 Finally, all of these laws were modified by local us-
age.9 The pressure to unify the law was intense. The
constitution of September, 1791, ordered such unification ~d
by 1804, with Napoleon's support, it had happened. lO The Na-
poleonic Code, as it has come to be known, was so well received
that Belgium, Holland, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Mexico, Chile
and Japan quickly followed suit. Then Germany enacted· its
code in 1896, and Switzerland did so in 1907.11 As in France,
codification in these countries arose from a need for unification
of diverse and often multiple legal systems. 12
Perhaps the absence of any such pressing need explains the
hostility with which the English common law system has
greeted codification. For many centuries England has had one
body of general law while other European countries required
codification to achieve such unification.13 By the thirteenth cen-
tury the common law had already been formed from customary
precedents and was a single system of law for the whole
realm.14 In common law England, the legislature was essen-
tially supplementary; the unwritten law was added to or modi-
fied when times suggested the need for modernization, but it
was not systematically reformed or reshaped. 15 Nonetheless,
the idea of reducing the English common law to a code goes
back as far as the reign of Henry VII.l6 In 1592, Francis Bacon
proposed to the House of Commons a plan to amend and consoli-
date the whole body of English law. l ? In 1653, Sir Matthew
Hale chaired a commission, which included Cromwell, that
drew up a plan for law reform. 18 It was not until the close of the
eighteenth century and the contribution of Jeremy Bentham,
8. [d.
9. [d.
10. [d. at 158-61.
11. [d. at 153.
12. [d. at 165.
13. [d. at 172.
14. M.E. LAND, CODIFICATION IN THE BRITISH EMPIRE AND AMERICA 11 (1924).
15. [d. at 21.
16. [d. at 28.
17. WARREN, supra note 4, at 513.
18. [d. at 513-14.
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
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however, that the codification movement became an important
force in England.19
Bentham gave his life to the codification movement. In
fact, he coined the words "codify" and "codification."20 Ben-
tham's work had an enormous influence: "His bold and insis-
tent attacks on the absurdities and injustice of the Common
Law of evidence and of the English system of criminal law were
the fountainhead of all the law reform of the Nineteenth Cen-
tury."21 Bentham wanted to simplify the law, to make it avail-
able to everyone and to eliminate (or at least reduce) the
ordinary man's dependence on lawyers.22 Bentham and others
were offended by their perception that the law was inaccessible
and uncertain.23 The root of this evil, they believed, was judge-
made law which was created by individual cases confined to
their facts and reported in numerous volumes stored in libraries
and law offices. Bentham thought that the solution lay in writ-
ing law in simple language and covering an entire field, thereby
leaving little or nothing for judges or commentators to
interpret.24
Bentham's views sparked efforts to codify English common
law. In 1833, William IV appointed a commission to examine
whether to codify criminallaw.25 After twenty years of revision,
the judges of England did not think that the law was uncertain
or that codification was needed, unanimously rejecting the pro-
posed codification.26 In fact, they concluded that codification
would create the very uncertainty that Bentham sought to elim-
inate. As a result, the government chose not to proceed with the
efforts to codify criminal law, which had been seen as a precur-
sor to codifying the entire law ofEngland.27 The plan was aban-
doned in 1854, resurrected in 1864, and abandoned again in
1867.
19. LANG, supra note 14, at 30-31.
20. WARREN, supra note 4, at 513.
21. [d. at 515.
22. JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLATION 92-95 (Richard Hildreth trans.,
Oceana Pub., Inc. 1975) (1914).
23. See IlJOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 620-81 (1911); SHELDON
AMos, THE SCIENCE OF LAW (New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1874).
24. BENTHAM, supra note 22, at 92.
25. LANG, supra note 14, at 42.
26. [d. at 42-48.
27. [d. at 53-54.
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Interestingly, one of the first successful common law codifi-
cations was of evidence law. In 1872, Sir James Fitz Stephen's
Indian Evidence Act was completed. Stephen was a high court
judge and criminal law scholar, and the impact of his code was
enormous. His work is generally regarded as the first success-
ful effort to codify the law of evidence and is the direct antece-
dent of modern codes.28 England's Attorney General Coleridge
quickly requested that Stephen's become a code of evidence for
England.29 Yet Parliament rejected the Stephen code, as it had
all of its predecessors.3o Unlike the rest of Europe, there was
not general support for the idea of codification in England. The
judges did not want it, the profession was skeptical, and the
people knew nothing about it. Although there have been re-
peated efforts to codify various bodies of English law, the com-
mon law has stubbornly survived.
B. The Transatlantic Adventure
Bentham's work found a far more receptive environment
across the Atlantic. Here, the codification movement was a re-
sponse to the dissatisfaction of lawyers. In addition, the gen-
eral public thought the law inaccessible and uncertain, and
many urged substantive reform.
Immediately after the revolution, the United States found
itself in need of a legal system. Post-revolutionary America
found that discovering and maintaining existing law was not
easy. Statutory law was published in pamphlet form, but the
pamphlets were difficult to find and there were few complete
sets.31 Moreover, these pamphlets were virtually impossible to
use since they were organized chronologically, not by subject,
and lacked indexes. Statutes were frequently amended in later
pamphlets and private laws were interspersed with public laws,
frequently on the same page. This lack of organization made
the statutes effectively unavailable for any practical use.32
28. Josiah H. Blackmore II, The Ohio Evidence Rules: 105 Year of Heritage
and Dilemma, 6 CAP. U.L. REV. 533, 533-35 (1977).
29. JAMES F. STEPHEN, A DIGEST OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE iii-iv (3d ed.
London, MacMillan 1877).
30. LANG, supra note 14, at 54-58.
31. CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT 6 (1981).
32. [d. at 6-7.
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
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The common law was equally inaccessible. Decisions were
announced in open court and were unpublished,33 leaving the
common law to the memory of the bar. The situation was exac-
erbated because many of the best lawyers and judges had been
Tories who had returned to England, taking their knowledge of
the law with them.34
While lawyers complained of inaccessibility, laymen com-
plained in much the same way that the American public com-
plains today. The public felt that the intricacies and
complexities of the law caused substantial injustice. As one
critic said, "those absurd rules of evidence [and] pleadings
[were] little better than 'gamblings' or 'hazards' that 'changed
simple justice into a professional mystery' and 'contributed to
oppression and plunder rather than happiness and security of
the people'."35
Post-revolutionary Americans also resented the expense
and time involved in litigation. A lawsuit was described in a
Philadelphia newspaper as a "contest of wealth."36 The same
newspaper complained that "the evasions [in the law] are so nu-
merous, and by technical forms so established, that the plainest
and most incontestable questions stand for years on the records
of our COurtS."37 The lay critic of yesterday, like today, claimed
that the complexities and uncertainties in law were the design
of the lawyer who conspired to keep law as complicated as possi-
ble in his own self-interest.38
The role of English common law was another complication
in creating an American legal system. Continuing English law
as precedent after the revolution was necessary for stability.
Yet much of it was neither appropriate nor welcome in the new
country. While most state governments expressly accepted
English statutory and common law as their law at the time of
33. [d. at 8-9.
34. [d. at 9.
35. [d. at 13 (quoting JESSE HIGGINS, SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES 15-16
(1807».
36. [d. (quoting AURORA (Phila.>, Nov. 9, 1804).
37. [d.
38. [d. at 14. See also Luke 11:52 ("Woe unto you, lawyers! For ye have taken
away the key of knowledge: Ye entered not in yourselves, and ye hindered them
who were entering in yeo").
7
178 PACE LAW REVIEW [Tribute
independence,39 the new governments deemed many portions
incompatible, excluding them by some general statutory provi-
sion.40 Thus, it was difficult to determine which precedents en-
dured and which perished.41 By 1820, American law had
matured to the point where statutory law was more available
and judge-made law was reported by private and, eventually,
public reporters. However, courts continued to use some (but
not all) English law and the general dissatisfaction with the law
and lawyers continued.42
This strong discontent made the United States receptive to
the reform movement already underway in Europe. Since the
most important goal ofAmerican law reform was to simplify the
law to make it more available to the people,43 codification was
the most vigorously promoted reform. Reformers sought to sub-
stitute a general code for the whole of common and statute
law.44 Former colonists saw codification as a tool to resolve con-
flicts and doubts by restating the law in useful, understandable,
modern and clearer terms.45 New York was at the forefront of
this movement. .
C. New York and the Codification Movement
By the early 1800s, many of the former colonies were en-
gaged in efforts to revise their statutes. New York, however,
produced the first codification in any common law jurisdiction.
New York's revision was different---even revolutionary because
it collected acts that were dispersed throughout the law but re-
lated to a common subject, consolidated them into a single act,
reworded laws to make them simpler and more comprehensible
and in many instances, modified the substance of the law. Ad-
ditionally, New York created entirely new laws to cover previ-
39. COOK, supra note 31, at 10. New York's first constitution declared that
"such parts of the common law of England and of Great Britain and of the acts of
the Colonial Legislature as together formed the law of the colony at the breaking
out of the Revolution in 1775, constituted the law of the State, subject to alteration
by the Legislature." N.Y. CONST., adopted April 20, 1777, quoted in WILLIAM A.
BUTLER, THE REVISION AND THE REVISERS 4-5 (New York, Banks & Bros. 1889).
40. COOK, supra note 31, at 10-11.
41. [d.
42. [d. at 24-31.
43. [d. at 65.
44. [d. at 70.
45. [d. at 84.
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
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ously excluded areas.46 Many rules found only in common law
were reduced to statute form. In some areas, such as property
law, important reforms were achieved and the law trans-
formed. 47 The revisions, which were completed in 1828,48 reor-
ganized major portions of the law in a systematic way and
reformed significant substantive areas of the law. The main
body of the common law, however, was left undisturbed.
Several factors made New York preeminent in the codifica-
tion movement. New York's rapid growth as a commercial and
agricultural center contributed to a huge increase in both its
statutory and decisional law. The enormous quantity of New
York law impeded accessibility and certainty, making codifica-
tionmore attractive.49 In addition, David Dudley Field, the
spearhead of the codification movement in America, was a New
Yorker.50 For forty years he worked as a law reformer, directing
his energies primarily to codifying the law in his state.
As a result of Field's efforts, the New York Constitutional
Convention of 1846 created two commissions: one to codify New
York's substantive law and the second to codify its procedural
law.51 Although not an,original member of either commission,
Field was quickly appointed to fill a vacancy in the commission
on procedural law. In five short months the commission pro-
duced the initial draft of a procedural code designed as the first
installment of an entire code of remedial law. This partial code,
which came to be called the Field Code, was enacted by the leg-
islature in April, 1848.52 One historian described it as
tightly worded and skeletal; there was no trace of the elaborate
redundancy, the voluptuous heaping on of synonyms so character-
istic of Anglo-American statutes. It was, in short, a code in the
French sense, not a statute. It was a lattice of reasoned princi-
46. [d. at 146-47.
47. [d. at 150-51.
48. BUTLER, supra note 39, at 45.
49. COOK, supra note 31, at 131-34.
50. [d. at 186.
51. [d. at 189-91.
52. This code was formally titled "An Act to Simplify and Abridge the Practice
and Pleadings and Proceedings of the Courts of the State." [d. at 191.
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pies, scientifically arranged, not a thick thumb stuck into the
dikes of the common law.53
The Field Code was more than a reorganization or revision
of existing law. It entirely redesigned the law of procedure,
abolishing the distinction between law and equity, eliminating
all the ancient forms of action at common law and abandoning
special forms of pleadings. The new code provided for only one
form of action and one method of commencing it.54 The commis-
sion continued its work and by 1850, had drafted codes that cov-
ered the entire law of procedure, both civil and criminal. 55 Yet,
the new proposals met serious opposition in the legislature.56
These codes, which included a codification of the law of evi-
dence,57 were never passed.
Undeterred, Field continued to draft codes, both procedural
and substantive.58 On February 13, 1865, codifications of the
entire civil and criminal substantive law were presented to the
legislature. The work was contained in three codes: a political
code, a penal code and a civil code.59 Although the legislature
twice passed the civil code, the Governor refused to sign it.60
After several attempts, the penal law was finally enacted on
July 26, 1881. Although there were further attempts to enact
the political and civil code they all failed largely because of the
53. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 340-41 (2d. ed.
1985).
54. COOK, supra note 31, at 192.
55. LANG, supra note 14, at 127.
56. By the time the new installments were presented, enthusiasm for the codi-
fication project had waned considerably. The first installment had not pleased eve-
ryone. Many at the bar were opposed to its experimental nature. Additionally, the
original installment had its flaws. Between its passage in 1848 and its repeal 30
years later, amendments and modifications enlarged its size nearly ten times over.
This effort at revision may have done more harm then good, since it significantly
increased the complexity of the original project. Some of the difficulty with the
Field Code can be attributed to the legislature's desire to finish it quickly. Com-
pleted in little over a year and a half, there was inadequate time to consider the
many innovations that ultimately were included. COOK, supra note 31, at 192-94.
57. NEW YORK STATE COMMISSIONERS ON PRACTICE AND PLEADING, THE CODE
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 692-789 (1850).
58. Despite the lack of enthusiasm for the codification effort, Field persisted.
In 1857, he convinced the legislature to reestablish the Commission on the Code
and to include himself as one of the Commissioners. COOK, supra note 31, at 195-
96.
59. LANG, supra note 14, at 139-40.
60. [d. at 145-46.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
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ardent opposition of the powerful Bar Association of the City of
New York.61
If Field was the hero of the codification movement, James
C. Carter was its villain.62 Writing at the behest of the Bar As-
sociation of the City of New York, Carter argued against codifi-
cation, making many of the same points made today. First,
Carter argued that courts are the superior forum for develop-
ment of the law because they decide matters in the context of
discrete and certain facts and seek to "do justice."63 As such,
courts must have the discretion to decide cases as justice re-
quires, rather than in conformity with rules created by a legis-
lature that lacks necessary expertise.64 Second, Carter asserted
that codification would prevent the natural development of the
law.65 Third, he reasoned that codification would not produce
the predicted certainty but would have the opposite effect, cre-
ating new issues for interpretation and new problems for practi-
tioners. Fourth, Carter argued that the real advocates of
codification were the law professors, who felt the need for struc-
tured text, rather than lawyers and judges, who were involved
in the practical administration of the law.66 Fifth, Carter ar-
gued that the problem was not with the law, but rather with
lack of clarity in the treatises.67 Finally, he argued against
tinkering with a system that worked reasonably well.68
Notwithstanding the legal community's conservatism, codi-
fication efforts were succeeding across the country. Before the
turn of the century the Field Code had become the basis of
codifications in thirty states and territories.69 One noted histo-
61. [d. at 146-47.
62. COOK, supra note 31, at 188.
63. JAMES C. CARTER, THE PROPOSED CODIFICATION OF OUR COMMON LAW 26
(1884).
64. [d. at 9. The legislature was also viewed as untrustworthy and too inter-
ested in the short-run political effects of their actions. FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at
404.
65. CARTER, supra note 63, at 30-36.
66. [d. at 72.
67. [d. at 73.
68. [d. at 71.
69. Missouri (1849), California (1850), Kentucky (1851), Iowa (1851), Minne-
sota (1851), Indiana (1852), Ohio (1853), Oregon (1854), Washington (1854), Ne-
braska (1855), Wisconsin (1856), Kansas (1859), Georgia (1860), Nevada (1861),
Dakota (1862), Idaho (1864), Arizona (1864), Montana (1864), North Carolina
(1868), Arkansas (1868), Wyoming (1869), South Carolina (1870), Florida (1870)
11
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rian has said of the Field code that it "more than any other stat-
ute on the subject, acted as a catalytic agent of procedural
reform in the United States."70 Further support for codification
came as the country became more and more industrial. As com-
merce flourished the need for a more uniform commercial law
grew. By 1900, the Negotiable Instruments Law had been
adopted by many states and the movement for other uniform
laws was well underway.71 The American Law Institute began
drafting uniform laws in the early 1900s. In the years since
many uniform codes have been drafted and enacted.72 Although
Field's vision of complete codification of the common law was
never realized, codification on a smaller scale has now become
widespread. 73 Throughout this process the law of evidence has
been a prime target for codification. Ironically, the codification
of evidence law has not occurred in New York, despite New
York's position as the early leader in the United States codifica-
tion movement.
(repealed 1873), Utah (1870), Colorado (1877), Connecticut (1879), North Dakota
(1889), South Dakota (1889), Oklahoma (1890), and New Mexico (1897). LANG,
supra note 14, at 131. The Civil Code was also accepted in the Dakota Territory,
Idaho, Montana and California. They also adopted the penal and political codes.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 405.
70. FRIEDMAN, supra note 53, at 391.
71. [d.
72. [d. at 674. See, e.g., UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promul-
gated in 1914 and adopted in 41 states); UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT, 6 U.L.A.
561 (1985) (promulgated in 1916 and adopted in 44 states); UNIF. FRAUDULENT
CONVEYANCE ACT, 7A U.L.A. 427 (1985) (promulgated in 1918 and adopted in 25
states); UNIF. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH ACT, 8A U.L.A. 557 (1985) (promulgated in
1940 and adopted in 47 states); UNIF. COMM. CODE, 1 U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promulgated
in 1952 and adopted in all 50 states); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT, 8A U.L.A. 15
(1985) (promulgated in 1968 and adopted in all 50 states) (amended in 1987); UNIF.
PROBATE CODE, 8 U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promulgated in 1969 and adopted in 15 states)
(amended in 1992); UNIF. CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT, 9 Part II U.L.A. 1 (1985)
(promulgated in 1970 and adopted in all 50 states) (amended in 1992); UNIF. CON-
SUMER CREDIT CODE, 7A U.L.A. 1 (1985) (promulgated in 1974 and adopted in four
states) (amended in 1992).
73. Lawrence M. Friedman, Law Reform in Historical Perspective, 13 ST.
LOUIS U. L.J. 351, 351 (1969).
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
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D. The Law of Evidence
Historically, the rules of evidence played an important role
in the general codification debate. 74 Since trials were local
events, often attended for amusement, the public became famil-
iar with the rules of evidence. The public viewed the rules of
evidence as archaic and irrational and yet another visible exam-
ple of the hypertechnical way lawyers kept the law.75 Accord-
ingly, the rules of evidence attracted Bentham's interest. 76
1. The Early Days
Bentham's early works on codifying evidence were used by
Edward Livingston. In 1830, Livingston wrote the first system-
atic code of evidence for Louisiana.77 Livingston sought to con-
trol judicial discretion by making the law simpler and clearer
and to reform the substance of the law. It was a formidable
task. Livingston's code was an early example of the extent to
which some codifiers favored a legislative monopoly over law-
making. Livingston sought to limit judicial power by prohibit-
ing judges from making rules of evidence and requiring judges
to stop the trial and send a report to the legislature if a new rule
was required.78 Not surprisingly, his code was never adopted,
but it sparked interest both in Massachusetts and New York,79
By the turn of the century, New York had tried to enact an
evidence code four times. As noted, David Field was responsible
for the first effort to codify the law of evidence in New York. On
December 31, 1849, a bill was submitted to the New York legis-
lature entitled "An Act to Establish a Code of Evidence."80 This
was the fourth part of Field's code of Civil Procedure and it was
rejected by the legislature.8! Thirty-seven years later, the same
bill, with a few minor amendments, was resubmitted. This time
the bill passed the legislature but met its demise at the hands of
74. CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 5005, at 63 (1977).
75.Id.
76. See JEREMY BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE (1827).
77. Id. at 65.
78.Id.
79.Id.
80. J.BLEECKER MILLER, AN ARGUMENT IN OPPOSITION To THE PROPOSED CODE
OF EVIDENCE 3 (1886).
81. Id. at 6.
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Governor Hill.B2 In 1887, the legislature again authorized a
committee to draft a code of evidence. Field prepared a code
based on the India Evidence Act.83 Again the legislature passed
the bill and again the governor refused to sign it.84 In 1900, the
legislature rejected a code of evidence prepared and submitted
by the Statutory Revision Commission, which had been ap-
pointed to consolidate and revise the general statutes of the
state.85 This ended the early attempts to codify New York's evi-
dence law.
2. Modern Efforts
By the beginning of the twentieth century dissatisfaction
with the substance of evidence law had become more common,
and reform was more frequently urged. Edmund Morgan Ob-
served that the ''law of evidence is in at least as bad a condition
as was that governing pleading in the day when David Dudley
Field began his crusade."86 Wigmore noted that "the opening of
a new phase in the profession's attitude toward the rules of evi-
dence, viz. a disposition to reconsider the rules' weaknesses,
and a willingness-even a determination-to improve that body
of law in every possible part."87
In 1920, the Commonwealth Fund, one of the first charita-
ble foundations, decided to encourage legal research. One of its
first undertakings was to reform the law of evidence. It formed
a distinguished committee, chaired by Professor Edmund Mor-
gan and including Dean John H. Wigmore.88 Mter more than
five years, the committee issued a report suggesting five
82. Edith L. Fisch, The Feasibility of Formulating a Code ofEvidence for the
State of New York, 12 REPORT OF JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE STATE OF NEW
YORK 182, 190 (1967).
83. [d. at 190.
84. [d. at 190-91.
85. [d. at 191.
86. [d. at 182 (quoting Edmund Morgan, Codification ofEvidence, FIELD CEN-
TENARY ESSAYS 164 (1949».
87. [d. at 192 (quoting 1 JOHN H. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE vii (3d ed.
1940».
88. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 77. Chief Justice William A. John-
ston of the Kansas Supreme Court, Judge Charles M. Hough of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, Professors Zechariah Chaffee, Jr. of
Harvard University, Ralph W. Gifford of Columbia University, Edward W. Hinton
of the University of Chicago and Edson R. Sunderland of the University of Michi-
gan, completed the group. [d.
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
1997] TRIBUTE TO BARBARA C. SALKEN 185
changes in the law of evidence.89 Although viewed by some as
"the first of a long line offailures,"90 the report was premised on
the notions that a trial is a search for the truth and that the
best way to get to the truth was to admit more evidence.91 This
assumption underlies all modern codifications.92 The work of
the Fund found expression in many federal and state statutes.
Indeed, it formed the basis for the next step in the evidence re-
form movement, the Model Code of Evidence.93
In 1942, with Morgan as reporter, the American Law Insti-
tute completed its Model Code of Evidence. The Model Code
was in many respects a truly revolutionary attempt at reform.
First, over the strident objection of Dean Wigmore,94 the law of
evidence was reduced to a code that was contained, even with
lengthy comments, in less that 300 pages.95 Second, the Model
Code significantly changed the hearsay rule. Under the Model
Code, hearsay was admissible as long as the declarant was
either present and available for cross-examination or unavaila-
ble as a witness.96 Third, the Model Code permitted the trial
judge substantial discretion,97 a reform that is most commonly
blamed for the Code's failure. 98 In any event, the Model Code of
Evidence was never adopted in any state.99
89. EDMUND M. MORGAN ET AL., THE LAw OF EVIDENCE-SOME PRoPOSALS FOR
ITS REFORM (1927). The suggested reforms were: (1) to create a business records
exception to the hearsay rule; (2) to repeal of the Dead Man's statute; (3) to create
of a new exception to the hearsay rule admitting the statements of an insane or
dead person; (4) to restore the power of a judge to comment on the evidence; and (5)
to establish a rule that would permit a judge to admit evidence without regard to
the rules of evidence in essentially uncontested matters. Id. at xix-xx.
90. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 80.
91. MORGAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 39.
92. See infra notes 316-19; EDMUND M. MORGAN, THE CODE OF EVIDENCE PRo-
POSED BY THE AMERICAN LAw INSTITUTE 539, 587, 694, 742 (1941); Jon R. Waltz,
The New Federal Rules of Evidence: An Overview, 1977 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 225,
230.
93. Blackmore II, supra note 28, at 536.
94. See John H. Wigmore, The American Law Institute Code of Evidence
Rules: A Dissent, 28 A.B.A. J. 23 (1942).
95. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 86.
96. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 231-34 (1942).
97. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 88; Spencer A. Gard, The New Uni-
form Rules of Evidence, 2 KAN. L. REV. 333 (1954).
98. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 88.
99. Id. at 88-89.
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The next attempt at codifying evidence rules came in 1953,
when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws promulgated the Uniform Rules of Evidence. The
Uniform Rules were simple; there were only seventy-two rules
contained in a pocket book of fifty-seven pages. IOO Unlike the
Model Code, the Uniform Rules did not seek dramatic reform of
the law of evidence. Rather, their goal was to provide a uniform
law that would be accepted and enacted throughout the coun-
try.IOI It turned out, however, that uniformity without reform
failed to marshall significant interest. As recently as 1953, law-
yers rarely practiced across state lines and so there was less
need for uniformity in evidence than in other areas, like com-
mercial transactions. In the end, only four states accepted the
Uniform Rules: Kansas (1964), California (1965), New Jersey
(1967) and Utah (1971).102 Yet it would be wrong to say that the
Uniform Rules had no impact; they did become the basis for
many of the Federal Rules of Evidence. lo3
3. The Federal Rules of Evidence
By the 1950s, the rules under which evidence was admitted
in federal courts were under attack from academic commenta-
tors, the judiciary and the bar. lo4 There were two principal crit-
icisms. First, there was the problem caused by the source of
evidentiary rules. The admissibility of evidence in civil cases
was controlled principally by Rule 43(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure,105 which allowed evidence in a federal court ifit
100. Id. at 91.
101. Id. at 90.
102. CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1-1605 (West 1965); :RAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-401 to -
470 (1964); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:84A-1 to -32 (West 1967); UTAH RULES OF EVI-
DENCE (1971). On September 1,1983, Utah enacted a new set of rules based on the
Federal Rules of Evidence. New Jersey is currently considering the same path.
103. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 90.
104. See, e.g., Thomas F. Green, Jr., Federal Civil Procedure Rule 43(a), 5
VAND. L. REV. 560, 580 (1952); Hon. Joe E. Estes, The Need for Uniform Rules of
Evidence in the Federal Courts, 24 F.R.D. 331 (1960); Report of the Special Com-
mittee on Uniform Evidence Rules for Federal Courts, 44 A.B.A. J. 1113 (1958).
105. Rule 43(a), the most important rule, covered admissibility and compe-
tency of witnesses. Nonetheless, 20 other rules also involved evidentiary ques-
tions: Rules 26-37 dealt with depositions and discovery; Rule 41(b) covered
involuntary dismissal; Rule 44 controlled proof of official records; Rule 45 regu-
lated subpoena and service; Rule 50 authorized a party to introduce evidence if the
party moved for and was denied a directed verdict at the close of the opponent's
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
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was admissible under federal statute, federal common law or
decisions, or under statutes or rules of the state where the dis-
trict court sat. The result was that evidentiary decisions within
a circuit were at the least non-uniform and occasionally un-
founded or conflicting.106 Second, reformers insisted that the
time had come to change the substance of evidence law. Since
Bentham's time, many judges, commentators and lawyers had
sought reform of evidence law. lo7 Commentators argued that it
needed to be clarifiedlo8 and modernized. 109 The time had come
to unify and overhaul the law of evidence. l1O
The real work of developing the Federal Rules of Evidence
began in March, 1961, at a special session of the Judicial Con-
ference of the United Statesl1l where a Committee recom-
mended that uniform rules of evidence be adopted. 112 In 1965,
the United States Supreme Court appointed an Advisory Com-
mittee on Rules of Evidence. 113 Four years later the first draft
was finished and, after revisions, was circulated for com-
evidence; Rule 59(a) permitted additional testimony on certain motions for new
trial; Rule 60(b) permitted admission of newly discovered evidence; Rule 61 was
the harmless error rule; Rule 68 made evidence of an unaccepted offer ofjudgment
inadmissible; and Rule 80(c) permitted proof of prior testimony by a transcript.
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United
States, Rules ofEvidence: A Preliminary Report on the Advisability and Feasibil-
ity of Developing Uniform Rules ofEvidence for the United States District Courts,
30 F.R.D. 73, 89 (1962).
106. See Standards Relating to Court Organization, Standards of Judicial
Administration, A.BA 73 (Handbook, 1961).
107. Thomas F. Green, Jr., Drafting Uniform Federal Rules of Evidence, 52
CORNELL L.Q. 177, 178 (1967).
108. [d. at 179. See also Mason Ladd, A Modem Code ofEvidence, 27 IOWA L.
REV. 213, 214 (1942).
109. Green, Jr., supra note 107, at 179. See also Edmund M. Morgan, Fore-
word, MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 5-6 (1942).
110. Morgan, supra note 109, at 6. See Ladd, supra note 108, at 218.
111. Morgan, supra note 109, at 75. At that time, the Standing Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure recommended that the Chief Justice appoint a
committee to study the advisability and feasibility of formulating uniform rules of
evidence for the federal courts. [d.
112. [d. at 77. The committee was chaired by Professor James Moore of Yale
Law School. It filed a preliminary report in February, 1962. [d.
113. 28 U.S.C. § 331 (1970). The Advisory Committee was chaired by Albert
E. Jenner, Jr., a noted Chicago trial lawyer, and included eight practitioners, three
judges and three law professors. The other members of the committee were: David
Berger, Hicks Epten, Robert Erdahl, Judge Joe Ewing Estes, Professor Thomas F.
Green, Jr., Egbert L. Hayward, Dean Charles W. Joiner (subsequently appointed
to the federal bench), Frank Raichle, Herman F. Selvin, Judge Simon E. Sobeloff,
17
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ments.114 The rules were revised in March and October,
1971,115 and November, 1972.116 The November draft was ap-
proved by the Court and sent to Congress.117 Both houses of
Congress then drafted their own rules that, while based on the
proposed rules, revised them in several major respects. 11S A
compromise reached by the two houses produced the present
Federal Rules of Evidence and they were finally enacted on Jan-
uary 2, 1975,119
The enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence led to a
near revolution in the states. One of the hoped-for by-products
of the rules was that states would adopt the final result. 120 In
Craig Spangenberg, Judge Robert Van Pelt, Professor Jack B. Weinstein (also sub-
sequently appointed to the federal bench), and Edward Bennett Williams.
114. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Rules of Evidence for the United States
Courts and Magistrates, 46 F.RD. 161 (1969).
115. Revised Draft ofProposed Rules ofEvidence for the United States Courts
and Magistrates, 51 F.RD. 315 (1971); Committee on Rules of Practice and Proce-
dure, Judicial Conference of the United States, Proposed Rules of Evidence (Rev.
Draft Oct. 1971).
116. Rules ofEvidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, 56 F.R.D.
183 (1972).
117. [d. at 184.
118. The proposed rules had a relatively easy time until they reached the Con-
gress. There, however, difficulties developed. First, when the rules sent to Con-
gress were compared with the 1971 revised draft, it was discovered that nine ofthe
77 proposed rules had been changed by the Judicial Conference at the request of
the Kleindienst Justice Department. These changes were made after the deadline
had expired for public examination of and comment on revisions. Waltz, supra
note 92, at 228. Second, Congress was annoyed that the Supreme Court had in-
cluded a date that would have made the rules automatically effective in the ab-
sence of congressional approval, even though it was authorized to do so under the
Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982). Led by a few influential members,
Congress passed a bill that required the affirmative consent of Congress before the
rules could be deemed effective. Rules of Evidence, Civil Procedure and Criminal
Procedure Act of March 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9. See also WRIGHT &
GRAHAM, supra note 74, at 102; H.R REP. No. 52, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1973).
Then the battle really began. The Advisory Committee had been successful in re-
jecting the lobbying of special interest groups, WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74,
at 102, for instance, the American Medical Association's objection to the elimina-
tion of the doctor-patient privilege. Congress was not. Although a number of spe-
cial interest groups entered the fray, the principal battle was waged largely
between the Justice Department, with its list of law enforcement objectives, and
liberal members of Congress. [d.
119. Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (1975).
120. Rules of Evidence, Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
the Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess. 34 (1973) (statement of Albert E. Jenner).
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some states drafting projects were undertaken even before the
Court sent the rules to Congress.l21 In 1971, Nevada adopted
rules based on the Preliminary Draft. New Mexico and Wiscon-
sin adopted rules based on the 1972 version, even though it was
being hotly contested in Congress at the time. 122 Eleven more
states followed suit in the first years after the Federal Rules
were enacted. l23 Today thirty-four states have adopted the Fed-
eral Rules. 124
4. New York's Response to the Proposed Federal Rules
New York's first efforts at a modem evidence code substan-
tially antedate the Federal Rules. In 1958, the Advisory Com-
mittee on Practice and Procedure of the Temporary Commission
on the Courts recommended that New York study adoption of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence.125 In 1966, the State Judicial
Conference commissioned such a study.126 It concluded that
121. L. Kivin Wroth, The Federal Rules ofEvidence in the States: A Ten-Year
Perspective, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1315, 1318 (1985).
122. [d. at 1318-19.
123. [d. at 1319-20.
124. ALAsKA STAT., R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1992); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN., R.
EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1992); ARK. CODE ANN., R. EVID. §§ 101-1102 (Michie 1992);
COLO. REV. STAT., R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1984 & Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN., R.
EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 90.101-.958 (West 1979 & Supp.
1992); HAw. REV. STAT., R. EVID. §§ 101-1102 (1985 & Supp. 1991); IDAHO R. EVID.
§§ 101-1103 (1992); IOWA CODE, R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1984 & Supp. 1992); LA.
CODE EVID. ANN. (West Sp. Pamph. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. (West
1991); MICH. COMPo LAws, R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1992); MINN. STAT. ANN., R. EVID.
50 §§ 101-1101 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-1 to -153 (1972
& Supp. 1991); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 26-10-101 to -1008 (1991); NEB. REV. STAT.
§§ 27-101 to -1103 (1988 & Supp. 1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 47.020 - 52.395 (1991);
N.H. R. EVID. §§ 100-1103 (1992); N.M. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. §§ 11-101 to -102
(Michie 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1, RULES 101-1102 (1988); N.D. CENT. CODE,
R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1990-91>; OHIO REV. CODE ANN., R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1992);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2101-3103 (West 1980 & Supp. 1992); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 40-010 to -585 (1991); R.I. GEN. LAws, R. EVID. (1991-1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAws
ANN. §§ 19-9-1 to 19-18-8 (1987 & Supp. 1992); TENN. CODE ANN., R. EVID. §§ 101-
1102 (1990-1991); TEx. CODE ANN., TEx. CIVIL R. EVID. AND TEx. CRIM. CODE EVID.
(1990-1991); UTAH CODE ANN., R. EVID. (1992); VT. STAT. ANN., R. EVID. §§ 101-
1103 (1983 & Supp. 1991); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5.04-5.64 (West 1963 & Supp.
1992); W. VA. CODE, R. EVID. §§ 101-1102 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02
(West 1975 & Supp. 1991); WYo. STAT., R. EVID. §§ 101-1103 (1979).
125. Second Preliminary Report of the Advisory Committee on Practice and
Procedure, N.Y. LEGIS. Doc. No. 13, at 87-88 (1958).
126. Stanley H. Fuld, The History and Progress of the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence, 19 N.Y. L.F. 741, 742 (1974).
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codification should be undertaken as soon as possible and
should include a complete substantive revision, not merely a re-
statement of existing law. 127 The Judicial Conference whole-
heartedly endorsed these recommendations and repeatedly
(though unsuccessfully) urged the legislature to fund the propo-
sal.128 In 1973, the New York State Bar Association presented
to the legislature a proposal for Codification of the law of evi-
dence based on its own study and report. 129
Not until 1976, however, did the legislature commit funds
to the codification effort, increasing the allotment of the New
York Law Revision Commission130 by $65,000,131 The Commis-
sion appointed a team of consultants to research and draft the
code and an advisory panel to screen the product.132 The plan
was to use the Federal Rules of Evidence as an organizational
model, but to look to the Federal Rules, the California Evidence
Code and New York common law for substantive guidance. l33
The goal was to complete the project by 1979.134
In 1978, the Law Revision Commission reported that the
project was on schedule. 135 By 1979, the consultants completed
a first draft. By the end of the year they had completed a final
127. Fisch, supra note 82, at 194-95.
128. Fuld, supra note 126, at 743.
129. [d.
130. The Law Revision Commission was created by chapter 597 of the Laws of
1934, article 4-A ofthe Legislative Law. It is the oldest continuous existing agency
in the common law world devoted to law reform through legislation. It consists of
five members appointed by the Governor, each for a term of five years, and the
chairs of the Judiciary and Codes Committees of the New York State Senate and
Assembly, as ex officio members.
131. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION
IN 1976, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR NEW YORK, 1977 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 10
[hereinafter 1977 N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP.].
132. [d. The consultants were: Jerome Prince, Dean Emeritus of Brooklyn
Law School; Professor Harold L. Korn of Columbia; Professor Faust F. Rossi of
Cornell; Professor Travis H. D. Lewin of Syracuse; and Professor Michael M. Mar-
tin of Fordham. The Advisory Panel was composed of Bernard S. Meyer, Chair-
man (later Associate Judge of the New York Court of Appeals); Judge Eugene R.
Canudo, Court of Claims; Edward H. Cole, Counsel, Senate Codes Committee;
Charles F. Crimi; James Dempsey; Judge John M. Keane, Surrogate; John F. Kee-
nan, Special Prosecutor, New York City; William B. Lawless; Douglas McCuen,
Associate Counsel to Assembly Majority Leader; Judge Nathan Sobel, Surrogate;
and Judge Paul J. Yesawich, Jr.
133. 1977 N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP., supra note 131, at 13.
134. [d. at 14.
135. [d. at 9.
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draft with commentaries, both approved by the Advisory Panel.
West Publishing Company printed and published the Proposed
Code of Evidence pro bono in the 1980 McKinney's session laws
and distributed more than one thousand additional copies to
legislators, judges, lawyers and other interested parties. 136
The draft code was more dependent on the Federal Rules
than had originally been contemplated. Not only did the draft
code follow the form of the Federal Rules, but it also tracked
their language and the commentaries noted and explained any
differences between the two. Language was sometimes modi-
fied to correct a perceived imperfection in the Federal Rules and
occasionally the drafters proposed a rule that was different in
substance.137
The Senate and Assembly Judiciary and Codes Committees
held public hearings throughout the state.138 Following the
hearings, the Commission and its staff reviewed and revised the
draft. During 1981, in an attempt to achieve consensus, the
Commission met with "each and every person, or groups of per-
sons, or organizations, who expressed a desire to explore the
reasoning behind Commission proposals."139 The bill was fi-
nally offered in the legislature on March 19, 1982,140 but was
referred to the Codes Committees ofeach house to be considered
as study bills.141
On January 5, 1983, the bill was resubmitted to the legisla-
ture in almost identical form. 142 West Publishing Company
printed, distributed and made available this later edition. Once
more the Senate and Assembly Codes and Judiciary Commit-
136. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION
IN 1979,M A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR NEW YORK, 1980 N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP.
9.
137. Joseph M. McLaughlin, Trends, Developments, New York Trial Practice:
Code of Evidence, N.Y. L.J., May 9, 1980, at 1.
138. Id. at 10. Hearings were held in Buffalo, New York City and Syracuse.
139. NEW YORK LAw REVISION COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION
IN 1982, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR NEW YORK, 1983 N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP. 8.
140. S. 3375, A. 11279, N.Y. Leg. 205th Sess. (1982).
141. Michael M. Martin, Trends, Developments, New York Trial Practice:
Code ofEvidence, N.Y. L.J., May 14, 1982, at 1. A study bill is intended for com-
mittee consideration and is not offered for enactment.
142. Id. at 8; S. 334, A. 332, N.Y. Leg. 206th Sess. (1983).
21
192 PACE LAW REVIEW [Tribute
tees held joint hearings. l43 By then, support for the idea of codi-
fication was waning and serious difficulties had developed on
the political front. The Senate bill was reported out of the
Codes Committee and advanced to a third reading in the Sen-
ate, but was then recommitted to the Codes Committee. The
Assembly Codes Committee did not report the Assembly bill to
the legislature. The Commission worked on revisions through
1984, attempting to meet the objections of all those who had
commented on any of its provisions.144 The resulting draft was
no more successful in either house of the legislature. In 1985,
the code bill was introduced in both the Senate and Assembly.
It remained there, unchanged and without legislative action,
until 1988.145
5. The Current Effort at Codification
In 1988, the Law Revision Commission mounted what may
be the last effort to enact a code of evidence. A working group
was formed, headed by Robert M. Pitler, a Professor at Brook-
lyn Law School. l46 With the support of Governor Cuomo, the
working group spent 1989 reviewing the previous drafts and de-
veloping a new version of an evidence code that sought primar-
ily to codify existing law rather than introduce changes.147 The
new proposed draft was submitted to the legislature as part of
the Governor's Program Bill in 1990.148 Public hearings were
143. Hearings were held in New York City on February 25, 1983 and in Al-
bany on March 2, 1983. Martin, supra note 141, at 8.
144. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COMMISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION
IN 1984, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR NEW YORK, 1985 N.Y. LAw REV. COMM'N REP. 6.
145. S. 2132, A. 2893, N.Y. Leg. 208th Sess. (1985).
146. The working group consists of Evan A. Davis, Counsel to the Governor:
Lise Gelernter, Assistant Counsel; Commissioner Carolyn Gentile, Chairwoman;
Commissioner Kalman Finkel; Commissioner Albert J. Rosenthal; Commissioner
Robert M. Pitler; Gregory V. Serio, Counsel to Senator John R. Dunne; Franklin
Breselor, Counsel to Senator Dale M. Volker; Milton Amgott and Michael
Garabedian, Counsels to Assemblyman Oliver Koppell; Frederick Jacobs, Counsel
to Assemblyman Sheldon Silver; James Yates, Legislative Counsel to the Speaker
of the Assembly; Alyse Gray, Esq. and Harry Dunsker, Interim Speaker's staff;
James Cantwell, Assistant Counsel to the Senate Majority Leader; and M. Dawn
Herkenham, Counsel, Criminal Justice Services. NEW YORK LAW REVISION COM-
MISSION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE COMMISSION IN 1988-89, A CODE OF EVIDENCE FOR
NEW YORK, 1989 N.Y. LAW REV. COMM'N REP. 282.
147. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, at xix.
148. Id. at xviii.
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held in New York City on July 24, 1990. Based on comments
and submissions at that hearing, the working group redrafted
the proposal and resubmitted the new proposal to the Governor
on March 21, 1991.149 Governor Cuomo offered that draft to the
1991-1992 session of the legislature where, despite a more re-
ceptive environment, it died again in the Assembly Code
Committee.150
Notwithstanding the apparent intransigence of the legisla-
ture, New York is closer than it has ever been to adopting an
evidence code.
II. The Current Debate
Since 1976, when it first committed funds to the codifica-
tion effort, the New York legislature has conducted three sets of
public hearings on three different versions of a code.151 Inter-
estingly, support and opposition to these proposals has re-
mained unchanged, notwithstanding significant differences in
the various drafts. The principal supporters ofcodification have
been trial lawyers associations152 bar associations,153 and, with
149.Id.
150. Telephone Interview with James Yates, Counsel to the Assembly (July 6,
1991).
151. Joint public hearings were held by the New York State Law Revision
Commission, Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing
Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly
Standing Committee on Codes. The first set of hearings were held on November
12,1980 in Buffalo, November 19,1980 in New York City and December 10,1980
in Syracuse. The first proposed draft was reconsidered in light of these and other
comments and a new draft was proposed in late 1982. A second round of hearings
were held, the first New York City on February 25, 1983 and a second in Albany on
March 2,1983. The most recent draft was commented on at a public hearing held
in New York City on July 24, 1990.
152. See, e.g., Memorandum from the New York State Trial Lawyers Associa-
tion on S. 7694 & A. 10557 1 (1990) (on file with author).
153. See, e.g., Resolution of the House of Delegates of the New York State Bar
Association (Apr. 27, 1984) (on file with the author); Proposed Code ofEvidence for
the State of New York: Joint Public Hearing of the New York State Law Revision
Commission, Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing
Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly
Standing Committee on Codes 264 (Feb. 25, 1983) [hereinafter Hearings, Feb. 25,
1983] (testimony of Richard H. Uviller, on behalf of the Bar Association of the City
of New York).
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some reservations, district attorneys.154 Although there are ex-
ceptions, these proponents are members of the bar who repre-
sent parties that most frequently carry the burden of proof. The
proposed codification has also found strong support within the
academic community.155 The opposition is mainly the criminal
defense bar, joined by civil lawyers who generally represent
defendants. 156
An analysis of the principal arguments offered by each side
of the debate reveals that codification will neither produce all
the benefits predicted by its proponents nor realize all the fears
envisioned by its opponents.
A. The Arguments in Favor of Codification
All codification movements have begun with the same three
premises: the common law is inaccessible; when discoverable,
154. The position of some District Attorneys has been lukewarm at best. See,
e.g., Proposed Code ofEvidence for the State ofNew York: Joint Public Hearing of
the New York State Law Revision Commission, Senate Standing Committee on the
Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Standing Com-
mittee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee on Codes 102-71 (July 24,
1990) [hereinafter Hearings, July 24, 1990] (testimony of Mark Dwyer on behalf of
the New York State District Attorneys' Association). The District Attorneys have
supported the concept of codification but have had reservations about particular
draft codes. See id. at 112.
155. See, e.g., Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 128 (testimony of
Professor Stephen Gillers, New York University School of Law); id. at 162 (testi-
mony of Professor Richard Uviller, Columbia Law School); Proposed Code of Evi-
dence for the State ofNew York: Joint Public Hearing of the New York State Law
Revision Commission, Senate Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly
Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Standing Committee on Codes, and
Assembly Standing Committee on Codes 4-5 (Mar. 2, 1983) [hereinafter Hearings,
Mar. 2, 1983] (testimony of Professor Roderick Surratt, Syracuse Law School);
Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 36-37 (testimony of Dean Jerome
Prince). But see Proposed Code ofEvidence for the State ofNew York: Joint Public
Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commission, Senate Standing Com-
mittee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Senate
Standing Committee on Codes, and Assembly Standing Committee on Codes 562
(Nov. 19, 1980) [hereinafter Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980] (testimony of Bennett
Gershman, Pace University School of Law, speaking in support of the common law
system).
156. See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 36 (testimony of
Gerald Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers); James M. Furey, Position Paper on the Proposed Code of Evidence by
the Tort Reparations Committee of the New York State Bar Association (1982);
Letter from David Siegel, Albany Law School to Edward J. Hart, Chair of the New
York State Tort Reparations Committee (Feb. 11, 1984) (on file with the author).
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the law is unclear and not uniformly applied; and, even when
the law is found and understood, it often needs substantive re-
form. The efforts to codify New York's law of evidence are no
exception. Every argument that has been offered to support
codification of the law of evidence fits into one of these three
categories.
1. Inaccessibility
Proponents of codification argue that New York law is diffi-
cult to use because it is difficult to find. Since the law of evi-
dence is only partially judge-made, it is scattered throughout
cases and statutes. Legislative enactments, in turn, are inter-
spersed throughout statutory law. Indeed, it has been observed
that over nine thousand provisions concern evidentiary rules. 157
In addition, some rules of evidence are found in both decisional
and statutory law. For example, the hearsay rule and many of
its exceptions, such as admissions or declarations against inter-
est, are decisional.158 Other hearsay exceptions, such as that
relating to business records, are statutory.159 Privileges are
statutory160 but most of the exceptions to privileges are deci-
sional.161 The principal advantage of any codification is that it
puts all the law, whether originally judge-made or legislative, in
one place, easily available to all. 162
157. Eugene R. Canudo & Harold Korn, Proposal for Codification of the New
York Law of Evidence, 1973 N.Y. ST. B.J. 527,528.
158. See Hayes v. Claessens, 234 N.Y. 230, 137 N.E. 313 (1922) (admissions
are an exception to the hearsay rule); Smith v. St. Lawrence County Nat'l Bank, 18
A.D.2d 1042, 238 N.Y.S.2d 585 (3d Dep't 1963) (admissions exception to hearsay
rule); People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289,385 N.E.2d 1245, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316 (1978)
(declarations against interest exception to hearsay rule); People v. Thomas, 68
N.Y.2d 194, 500 N.E.2d 293, 507 N.Y.S.2d 973 (1986) (declaration against interest
exception), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 948 (1987).
159. N.Y. CN. PRAc. L. & R. 4518 (McKinney 1992).
160. See, e.g., N.Y. CN. PRAc. L. & R. 4502(b) (McKinney 1992) (marital
privilege).
161. See, e.g., Poppe v. Poppe, 3 N.Y.2d 312,144 N.E.2d 72,165 N.Y.S.2d 99
(1957) (marital privilege does not apply to statements aimed at destroying the
marital relationship).
162. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 227 (testimony of Robert
Pitler, on behalf of the New York County District Attorney's Office).
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Code proponents argue that improved access will improve
the quality of evidentiary arguments and decisions. 163 Accord-
ing to them, there is not area of law where the need for ascer-
taining accurate information in a short time is as great as in the
presentation of evidence. When an objection to evidence is
made, the trial judge must make an immediate ruling. While
some evidence questions can be anticipated, most cannot. Thus,
argue proponents, consolidation of all evidence rules in hand-
book form will benefit all participants and will result in fewer
trial errors, reversals and costly retrials. 164
Opponents respond that New York's law of evidence al-
ready is available in a single volume, citing Richardson on Evi-
dence and Fisch on New York Evidence. 165 There are two
problems with this response. First, of course, these treatises
are not the law, but the authors' distillation of the law. Even
conceding that treatise writers are correct in their summaries,
the common law basis for the treatises does not offer a prospec-
tive litigant the same information as codification will provide.
Courts decide cases based on the facts before them; their goal is
not to prescribe the law for the future. A trial court considering
an evidence dispute in a common law system must look at the
case offered as precedent. The facts of the current case will not
be identical to those the earlier court had before it and the ap-
plicability of the prior ruling will depend on many subtle vari-
ables. 166 Codified law, on the other hand, is prospective; it is
designed solely for future use. The question for courts deciding
an evidence question under a code is the meaning of particular
163. "The proposed code will, if adopted, prove of great service to both the
student who must master the Law of Evidence, and to the judge and trial practi-
tioner who must apply it on a daily basis." Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note
155, at 460-61 (testimony of Richard Rifkin, Deputy First Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral, representing the New York State Department ofLaw); see also Hearings, July
24, 1990, supra note 154, at 33 (testimony of Judge William Donnino, on behalf of
the Chief Administrator's Advisory Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure).
164. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 10-12 (testimony of Carolyn
Gentile).
165. JEROME PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE (lOth ed. 1973) [hereinafter
RICHARDSON]; EDITH L. FISCH, FISCH ON NEW YORK EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1977).
166. Such as, how close are the facts of the prior case to the facts of the cur-
rent case? What was the precedent-setting court trying to accomplish? Were there
equitable considerations that were instrumental in the prior court's ruling? How
important was the particular piece of evidence to the party seeking or objecting to
its admission?
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words in the statute. Codification brings the rule of law itself
into the courtroom rather than the holding of various cases.
Second, though of lesser concern, is the difficulty of keeping
treatises updated. The current edition of Fisch was published
in 1977 and required yearly supplements.167 Richardson is even
older; the latest edition was published in 1972 and has not been
updated since 1985.168
Yet proponent's argument that a code will provide concrete
evidence law is also faulty. The proposed rules are not a codifi-
cation as that term is generally understood. The New York
rules will consist of approximately 100 relatively brief rules
compared to the 401 sections of the Uniform Commercial Code,
the 575 sections of the Internal Revenue Code, or even the 287
sections of the California Evidence Code. It is apparent that
these New York rules do not constitute a code in the usual
meaning of the term. Instead, these provisions sometimes lay
down a black-letter rule,169 sometimes merely set forth a princi-
ple,170 and sometimes regulate a matter to discretion or another
source of authority,171 Since evidence, like torts, is subject to an
infinite variety of situations, anything more than guidelines
would quickly become unworkable.
At the same time, it is hard to deny that codification will
put the law of evidence in everyone's pocket or purse. The Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence are available in a 4" by 6" pamphlet of
fifty-five pages.172 The New York rules, though slightly longer,
will also be available in compact form. They will not be exhaus-
tive, but will permit all parties to begin a discussion about the
admissibility of some piece of evidence from the same reference
point. If the issue is the admissibility of a medical record, for
instance, all participants will have to decide whether the partic-
ular document meets the requirements of the hearsay excep-
tions in proposed rule 803(c)(2) (then-existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition), proposed rule 803(c)(3) (state-
167. FISCH, supra note 165.
168. RICHARDSON, supra note 165.
169. See, e.g., 1991 ProposedN.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 605 (prohibiting a judge
from testifying at a trial, proceeding, or hearing at which the judge is presiding).
170. See, e.g., id. § 402 (all relevant evidence is admissible).
171. See, e.g., id. § 403 (permitting exclusion of relevant evidence when its
prejudicial effect outweighs its probativeness).
172. FED. R. EVID. (National Institute for Trial Advocacy 1991).
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ments for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment), or pro-
posed rule 803(c)(5) (business records). On balance, it seems
indisputable that codification will make evidence rules more
accessible.
Further, it is critical that trial lawyers have a solid under-
standing of the principles underlying evidence law since eviden-
tiary issues must be recognized immediately, responded to
without delay and decided promptly. Yet, anyone who has ever
sat in a courtroom has observed that evidence problems are
handled by the trial bar and bench unevenly at best. Codifica-
tion can raise the level of that performance by making it easier
to learn basic evidence concepts. The Code will be a convenient,
easily transportable focus of study for lawyers and law stu-
dents. As with the Federal Rules, there will be annotated edi-
tions collecting the cases and, as with the current proposal,
extensive commentary. Enactment of the Federal Rules in
other states has stimulated much evidence scholarship, includ-
ing excellent treatises which provide useful materials for edu-
cating future lawyers and practicing lawyers and judges.l73
Additionally, it is not by chance that evidence professors all
over the country teach evidence through the Federal Rules. 174
It is not simply a desire to prepare students for practice in fed-
eral court or to avoid the stigma of localism. The common law
principles of evidence could be the basis of a very challenging
and useful evidence course. It is not usually done because it
makes learning evidence harder than it need to be and harder
than it is under the code. Students, like lawyers, work better
with rules than with judicial holdings because the rules allow
them to go directly to the evidence principle at issue. Learning
evidence from common law cases requires that a student iden-
tify the principle in the holding which is frequently hidden
173. See, e.g., Kenneth Graham, State Adaptation of the Federal Rules: The
Pros and Cons, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 293, 312 n.87 (1990), citing 1 M. UDALL & J.
LIVERMORE, ARIZONA PRACTICE: LAW OF EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1982); C. EHRHARDT,
FLORIDA EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1984); P. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE
(1979); L. KIRKPATRICK, OREGON EVIDENCE (1982); S. GOODE ET AL., GUIDE TO THE
TExAs RULES OF EVIDENCE: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (1988); K TEGLAND, WASHINGTON
PRACTICE EVIDENCE (2d ed. 1982). For a discussion of why inclusion in these trea-
tises is important, see infra notes 195-97 and accompanying text.
174. Margaret A. Berger, The Federal Rules ofEvidence: Defining and Refin-
ing the Goals of Codification, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 255, 257 (1984).
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among facts and dicta. The principle must first be extracted
before it can be examined and its application in new situations
considered. Evidence taught from the Federal Rules, however,
gives the student a clearer starting point. The student must
still consider the rule's application to new facts, but the student
can begin with the rule itself. Obviously, the better one learns
evidence in the classroom the better one will later practice it in
the courtroom. Codifying the law of evidence will enhance this
process.175
2. Clarification and Unification
The desire to unify the law has been a powerful and impor-
tant influence in all codification efforts. In fact, codification has
been most successful when uniformity was the primary concern
of reforms. 176 The law of evidence is no exception. The desire
for uniformity within the federal system and between federal
and state courts has been a principal purpose in the movement
to codify the law of evidence in this country.177 The Federal
Rules themselves were erected from the skeletal efforts origi-
nally designed to provide uniform state laws.178 In New York,
proponents of codification desire uniformity on two different
fronts. 179 One is uniformity within the state. The second is con-
175. I am not suggesting that New York evidence teachers will begin to teach
evidence courses based exclusively on the codified New York Rules of Evidence.
Rather, once New York law adopts the language and format of the Federal Rules,
both the differences and similarities will be accessible to teachers and students of
evidence law.
176. See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text.
177. Wroth, supra note 121, at 1321. See also Graham, supra note 173, at
298. In fact, the desire for uniformity has strong roots in American legal history.
Uniformity in the law was one of the stated goals ofthe American Bar Association
when it was organized in 1878 and when the National Conference of Commission-
ers on Uniform State Laws held its first meeting back in 1892. WRIGHT & GRAHAM,
supra note 74, at 76. New York itself had an early interest in uniform state laws.
The New York legislature created commissioners to promote uniform state laws
before the turn of the century. Id.
178. Wroth, supra note 121, at 1317. The Federal Rules were influenced con-
siderably by the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence and the Uni-
form Rules of Evidence of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws, both of which "had been developed primarily to provide model legisla-
tion for state adoption." Id.
179. Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 460 (testimony of Richard
Rifkin, Deputy First Assistant Attorney General, representing the New York State
Department of Law). See also Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 31-32
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formity within between the Federal Rules of Evidence and New
York's law of evidence.
As to statewide uniformity, proponents urge that evidence
questions are decided at the trial level in an idiosyncratic fash-
ion.I80 As a result of inaccessibility or ambiguity in the law, in-
dividual trial judges have developed their own rules of evidence.
The consultants and advisory panelists who drafted the 1982
proposed code discovered many instances of such "local rules" of
evidence.18l Code supporters insist that codification will elimi-
nate these inconsistencies.182 It is their view that simplifying
the law of evidence and reducing it to a few easily understood
rules will mean that everyone will see the law of evidence
through the same eyes.183 To some extent, they may be correct.
Codification can clarify the law, make it more available and
eliminate some of the ambiguities that have developed in cases.
Therefore, codification may help some judges apply the law
more uniformly. But it is too much to expect that an evidence
code will turn the law of evidence into hard and fast rules o[r]
will turn everyone into evidence scholars.
Proponents second concern with uniformity, however, is
that conformity between New York and the Federal Rules needs
to be given greater consideration. Having a code modeled on
(testimony of Dean Jerome Prince, Senior Consultant to the Law Revision
Commission).
180. See, e.g., Hearings, Mar. 2, 1983, supra note 155, at 21 (testimony of Mel-
vin Freidel, on behalf of the Trial Lawyers Section of the State Bar Association).
181. Report of the Special Committee to Review the Proposed Code of Evi-
dence for the State of New York, New York State Bar Association 7 (1984) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter NYSBA]; Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at
264 (testimony of Professor Richard Uviller of Columbia Law School, on behalf of
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York).
182. See, e.g., Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 229 (testimony of
Peter Grishman, Administrative Assistant District Attorney on behalf of Mario
Merola, District Attorney of Bronx County) ("I think that a Code would provide us
with a greater degree of uniformity among the trial bench ... a Code of Evidence is
necessary for us to get uniformity among the trial bench."); Hearings, Feb. 25,
1983, supra note 153, at 264 (testimony of Professor Richard Uviller, on behalf of
the Bar Association of the City of New York) ("In our opinion the codification of our
Rules of Evidence will greatly enhance the consistency and the intelligibility of our
Common Law of Evidence. A number of rules, which have in their Common Law
form remained regrettably obscure are frequently misunderstood, and variously
applied by the court.").
183. See Hearings, Mar. 2, 1983, supra note 155, at 5 (testimony of Professor
Roderick Surratt, Syracuse Law School).
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the Federal Rules would enable lawyers to work more efficiently
in both state and federal court and in the vast majority of states
that have adopted codes based on the federal mode1.l84 Using a
code based on the Federal Rules also would permit New York's
law of evidence to benefit from the larger laboratory of federal
courts and states that have already adopted a code following on
that model. l85
The attraction of uniformity, or at least similarity, between
federal and state rules is attested to by the thirty-four states
that have modeled their own laws on the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence. No state, however, has adopted every provision of the
Federal Rules. New York's reliance on its own common law as
the substantive foundation for most of its rules is not unique. l86
A study of state codifications in 1985 showed that two-thirds of
the Federal Rules provisions had been modified when enacted
in various states; only one state had fewer than ten substantial
changes in its version of the seventy-seven rules that make up
the Federal Rules. Most states had many more. l87
184. See, e.g., Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 28 (testimony of
Dean Jerome Prince); NYSBA, supra note 183, at 8; Letter from Judge Jack B.
Weinstein to Judge Thomas M. Stark, reprinted in Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra
note 155, at 493.
185. Id.; see also Hearings, Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 515 (testimony of
Professor Arthur Best, New York Law School).
186. See supra note 2.
187. Wroth, supra note 121, at 1322. Five types of variations were found. Id.
at 1322-24. Interestingly, examples of each of these variations can also be found in
the Proposed New York Code. First, some of the variations were only technical.
For instance, state counterparts had to be used rather than references to federal
laws and court structures. Compare ME. R. EVID. 402 with FED. R. EVID. 402. For
an example of this accommodation in the proposed New York Code, compare 1991
Proposed NY.C.E., supra note 3, § 402 with FED. R. EVID. 402. Second, many
states have retained what they perceived as traditional state practice. Compare,
e.g., N.H. R. EVID. 611 (b) with FED. R. EVID. 611(b). For an example in the pro-
posed New York Code, compare 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 803(b)(3)
with FED. R. EVID. 80l(d)(2)(D) (admissions by a party's agent or employee).
Third, some states preferred the losing position regarding a matter hotly disputed
in the Congress. Compare, e.g., ME. R. EVID. 201 (g) with FED. R. EVID. 20l(g). For
an example in the proposed New York Code, compare 1991 Proposed NY.C.E.,
supra note 3, § 302 (which adopted the Edmund Morgan-Charles McCormick view
on presumptions originally approved by the Supreme Court) with FED. R. EVID.
301. (Congress eventually adopted the more conservative view of presumptions
associated with Professor James Thayer.). Fourth, states sometimes rejected all of
the positions that had been taken in the Congress in favor of their own solution to
a controversial issue. Compare, e.g., VT. R. EVID. 301 with FED. R. EVID. 301. For
an example in the proposed New York Code, compare 1991 Proposed NY.C.E.,
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Yet substantial similarity does exist. All the codes use a
common language, format, organization and numbering system.
All agree on which subjects should be included or excluded from
the code.188 Even with its express declaration of independence
from the Federal Rules model,189 the proposed code for New
York conforms in these important aspects of uniformity. Such
uniformity, superficial though it may seem, offers two principal
advantages: "(1) it allows lawyers who practice in both state
and federal court, or who have clients in more than one state, to
master only one basic set of rules, and (2) it provides practition-
ers and scholars alike ready access to a single nationwide body
of authority and commentary."190
Another benefit of uniformity merits serious considera-
tion.19l Uniformity can provide economies of scale.l92 Modeling
supra note 3, § 806 with FED. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(5). And, lastly, some states
included provisions that address issues ignored by the Federal Rules. See DEL.
UNIF. R. EVID. 304. For an example in the proposed New York Code, see 1991
Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 202 (determination oflaw).
188. Wroth, supra note 121, at 1348.
189. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, at xxi.
190. Wroth, supra note 121, at 1322.
191. I find it difficult to worry too much about the ease with which lawyers
practice in different forums. In my experience, most lawyers do not practice in
different forums. Even conceding the obvious, that unifying the law would be help-
ful to those that do cross jurisdictional lines, the potential benefit for that group
seems too small to impact meaningfully on the codification debate. See also Gra-
ham, supra note 173, at 296. Professor Kenneth Graham has noted a number of
other advantages to uniformity. First, it promotes fairness. It seems unfair that a
communication privileged in one jurisdiction would have to be disclosed merely
because the plaintiff files suit across the border in a neighboring state that does
not recognize the privilege. Second, uniformity promotes predictability. Uniform-
ity of evidence law may make outcome determinations more predictable for insur-
ance companies or manufacturers. Finally, it will reduce the cost oflegal services
in states with insufficient legal representation by permitting lawyers from other
states to fill the supply-demand gap. Professor Graham has even noted that the
appeal of uniformity may be psychological rather than rational:
There seems to be something in human nature that makes us more comfort-
able going wrong in a crowd, that makes us uneasy when we discover that
others take delight in pleasure we find bizarre or offensive, and that makes
the familiar seem safer, if less interesting, than the exotic. Even law profes-
sors who make fun of this foible can probably be found pulling in under the
Golden Arches when travelling rather than taking a chance on Ptomaine
Tillie's Truck Stop. Similarly, the Federal Rules may provide an aura of
reliability, rather like "genuine GM parts," that one does not get from local
job shops.
Id. at 300-01.
32http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
1997] TRIBUTE TO BARBARA C. SALKEN 203
a code, even to the extent of using the same numbering system,
after one currently in use in three dozen jurisdictions provides
the use with a rich resource. The greater the number of judges,
lawyers and legal scholars who apply the same rule, the more
likely one is to be able to find authority on that point. The body
of law will be richer as well. 193
Must New York actually codify to benefit from this national
experience? Clearly yes. By modeling its format on the Federal
Rules, the proposed code provides a common vocabulary and a
common approach. It allows New York to join the national legal
community by placing it in the national treatises. If a lawyer in
Minnesota wants to understand an intricacy in Minnesota's law
on dying declarations, the lawyer can look in Thompson's Min-
nesota Practice. 194 But the lawyer has other options. The law-
yer can look in Weinstein's Evidence195 or in Wright and
Graham's treatise. 196 There the lawyer can learn what Minne-
sota's law is on that point and also have the laws of sister states
to compare, since these national treatises include the law of all
those states speaking the language of the Federal Rules. But
the lawyer cannot learn what New York's law is on that point.
Similarly, the New York lawyer cannot turn to these national
treatises to benefit from the well-spring of knowledge that has
developed around the Federal Rules because New York's law is
not there and does not fit within this framework. Codification
can permit New York to take advantage of those benefits even if
it retains the substance of its law. But it must at least accept
the vocabulary of the Federal Rules, even if New York speaks
its own particular dialect.
3. Reform of Substantive Law
The desire to reform the law has helped to drive most codifi-
cation movements.197 New York's earlier efforts to codify its law
192. [d. at 299.
193. [d. at 300.
194. P. THOMPSON, MINNESOTA PRACTICE: EVIDENCE (1979).
195. JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE
(1990).
196. WRIGHT & GRAHAM, supra note 74.
197. See, e.g., LANG, supra note 14, at 74 (codification of Indian Law was moti-
vated, in part, to improve the substance of that law); ILBERT, supra note 4, at 158-
59 (need for amendment and reform of French law).
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of evidence were no exception.198 According to proponents, codi-
fication provides the best opportunity for revision of outdated or
otherwise unsound rules. 199 The adversary system places a
limit on the extent to which a court can remedy the deficiencies
in present law.20o First, it depends on the court's sensibilities.
Sometimes the court will not act even when it thinks the rule is
outdated and indefensible.201 Second, commonlaw development
can only occur piecemeal since the court can only address an
issue when it is presented in a particular case.202 Systemic
changes or revisions of a complicated set of principles is simply
not possible.203 Codification, however, can make the needed re-
forms. 204 Indeed, all recent codes have attempted to make some
of the suggested reforms.205
198. See, e.g., FISCH, supra note 165, at 185-87; Canudo & Korn, supra note
157; Stanley H. Fuld, Forward, 19 N.Y. L.F. 741 (1974).
199. See Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 14 (testimony of Carolyn
Gentile).
200. Id. at 36 (testimony of Dean Jerome Prince).
201. See Loschiavo v. Port Auth., 58 N.Y.2d 1040, 448 N.E.2d 1351, 462
N.Y.S.2d 440 (1983) (agent's admissions).
202. Id.
203. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 38; see also Michelson v.
United States, 335 U.s. 469, 485 (1948).
204. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 45 (testimony ofDean Jerome
Prince). The Association of the Bar of the City of New York argued that codifica-
tion would necessarily focus the attention of the bar on areas where the common
law of evidence offends common sense and saw some rewriting as a good thing.
Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 265 (testimony of Professor Richard
Uviller); Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 96-97 (testimony of Alton
Abromowitz, on behalf of the Committee on State Legislation of the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York). The New York State Bar Association also sup-
ports codification because of its potential for reforming antiquated or unjust rules
of evidence. It has argued that the codification process gives the legislature the
opportunity for reviewing, revising, organizing and bringing up to date this whole
area. NYSBA, supra note 183, at 809. There seems to be general consensus that
reform would be beneficial but no consensus on what that reform should be.
205. See Proposed Code of Evidence for the State of New York under consider-
ation by The New York State Law Revision Commission, Rule 80l(d)(1)(A) (Sp.
Pamph., West 1980) [hereinafter 1980 Proposed N.Y.C.E.] (permitted admission of
decarant's prior inconsistent statement for substantive purposes); New York Law
Revision Commission, A Code of Evidence For The State of New York, Submitted
to the 1982 Session of The Legislature, Commentary to Rule 601, (Sp. Pamph.,
West 1982) [hereinafter 1982 Proposed N.Y.C.E.] (eliminated dead man's statute);
1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, Rule 1003 (duplicates admissible as
originals).
34http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol17/iss3/17
1997] TRIBUTE TO BARBARA C. SALKEN 205
New York's current proposal, however, is an anomaly.
Although proponents of the current draft have urged enactment
to "modernize ... clarify ... assure reliability and fairness ...
and gently push the law along its path"206 political pressure has
greatly limited the ability of the drafters to make changes in the
substance of the rules.
The current draft is a concession to the reality that even
the most modern, just and well-drafted code will do New York
no good if the legislature will not pass it. The 1980 draft which
included many of the modernizations and reforms enacted in
the Federal Rules, such as inclusion of the present sense im-
pression207 and learned treatise208 exceptions to the hearsay
rule, and the restriction of prior bad acts used to impeach a wit-
ness to those bearing on truthfulness,209 was unable to win leg-
islative approval. The 1991-1992 draft is based on the
assumption that it will not change current law unless there is
good reason for change.21o As a consequence, it is the most con-
servative of the draft proposals and has been less objectionable
to those traditionally opposing codification.211 Nonetheless, as
this bill is considered by the legislative committees and ex-
amined by the bar, the pressure to maintain the status quo and
resist change continues. The drafters have been forced even to
retreat from some of the 1990 limited reforms proposed in the
original version of this bill, such as elimination of the often-crit-
icized Dead Man's Statute.212 This resistance to change is un-
206. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, at xix.
207. "A statement describing or explaining an event or condition made while
the declarant was perceiving the event or condition or immediately thereafter."
1980 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 206, § 803(1).
208. To the extent called to the attention of an expert witness upon cross-
examination or relied upon by him in direct examination, statements con-
tained in published treatises, periodicals or pamphlets on a subject of his-
tory, medicine, or other science or art, established as a reliable authority by
the testimony or admission of the witness or by other expert testimony or by
judicial notice. If admitted, the statements may be read into evidence but
may not be received as exhibits.
Id. § 803(18).
209. Id. § 608(b).
210. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, at xviii.
211. See Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 63 (testimony of Susan
Lindenauer).
212. The Dead Man's statute is a common law principle, currently codified at
N.Y. Cry. PRAC. L. & R. 4519 (McKinney 1990), which makes a person or party
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fortunate. If the legislature eventually enacts this code New
York will not reap the benefits of many of the lessons that have
been learned elsewhere.
Nonetheless, the New York rules make important and use-
ful reforms. Although some of them are technical and minor,
many are not. For instance, section 1003 modernizes the best
evidence rule by permitting the introduction of reproductions in
lieu oforiginals unless there is a genuine issue as to the authen-
ticity of the origina1.213 Modern methods of reproduction have
eliminated much of the need for strict application of the tradi-
tional rule that requires the original unless it has been lost or
destroyed. This is a significant improvement that will be wel-
comed by New York's COurtS.214 .
The proposal makes some interesting changes in the law of
privilege as well. For instance, section 501(c) changes New
York law by providing that privileged conversations overheard
by a third party without the privilege-holder's knowledge are
not necessarily waived.215 This makes good sense when the dis-
closure would defeat the policies underlying the particular priv-
ilege and when the holder of the privilege took reasonable
precautions against the unauthorized disclosure. The proposed
code also expands the applicability of professional privileges to
include those circumstances when the privilege-holder reason-
ably believes he or she is speaking to such a professional but is
actually speaking to someone unlicensed or otherwise not
qualified.216
interested in an event incompetent to testify to a personal communication or trans-
action with a deceased in an action against the estate of the deceased. It has been
the object of almost universal criticism for many years. See, e.g., JOHN WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE §§ 578, 578a (3d ed. 1940); MORGAN ET AL., supra note 89, at 23-35. It
was omitted from the Model Code of Evidence, the Uniform Rules of Evidence and
almost every modern codification. Also, see the proposed amendment to the decla-
ration against interest exception to the hearsay rule to include matters that would
"make the declarant an object of hatred, ridicule, or disgrace. . .." 1991 Proposed
N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 804(b)(4); S. 7694, A. 10557, N.Y. Leg. 213th Sess. 1
(1990).
213. See 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 1003.
214. See R.D.D. ENTER. v. EATON ALLEN INT'L, LTD., N.Y. L.J., Apr. 14, 1992.
at 21, 28 (noting and welcoming the modernized version ofthe rule in the proposed
code).
215. See 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 50l(c).
216. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 504 (attorney-client privilege),
§ 506 (doctor-clergy privilege), § 507 (doctor-patient privilege).
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Additionally, the proposed code clarifies some areas of the
law. For instance, the operation of presumptions has been par-
ticularly difficult and confusing. Like most jurisdictions, New
York has many kinds of presumptions that operate in a variety
ofways.217 Proposed section 302 would apply one rule to all pre-
sumptions in civil cases.218 Adoption of a single method of oper-
ation for all presumptions in civil cases has been favored by
most evidence scholars219 although which rule ought to control
has been hotly debated.220 The drafters of the code resolved the
debate by adopting "The so-called 'Morgan view,' giving pre-
sumptions the effect of shifting the burden of proof, rather than
just the burden of going forward, from the beneficiary of the
presumption to his opponent."221 The drafters adopted this rule
both because they agreed with it and because it more closely
reflected the current operation of presumptions under existing
New York practice.222 The position actually adopted is of less
significance than the fact that a single rule has been selected,
finally offering a glimmer of hope for consistent and under-
standable application in the future.
A number of other reforms are introduced in the code. Sec-
tion 405 permits proof of character through opinion evidence in
addition to evidence as to reputation.223 Section 408 excludes
statements in civil settlement discussions even if the state-
217. FISCH, supra note 165, § 1193.
218. See 1991 Proposed NY.C.E., supra note 3, § 302. A uniform rule that
would include criminal cases may be impossible given the constitutional restric-
tions imposed by the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Sandstrom v. Mon-
tana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979); IDster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140 (1979);
Mullaney v. Wilbur. 421 U.S. 684 (1975).
219. See EDMUND M. MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 76-81 (1956); Ed-
ward W. Cleary, Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12
STAN. L. REv. 5 (1959).
220. Cleary, supra note 220, at 5; see also EDMUND M. MORGAN, BASIC
PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 31-44 (1962); Edmund M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury
Upon Presumptions and Burden ofProof, 47 MARv. L. REV. 59, 82-83 (1933); JAMES
B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 337 (1898).
221. 1991 Proposed NY.C.E., supra note 3, § 302 cmt., at 33. This is in con-
trast to the Federal Rules's solution to the problem which adopted the more con-
servative or traditional view espoused by James Thayer which merely shifts to the
party against whom a presumption is directed the burden of going forward with
evidence to meet or rebut it. 120 CONGo REC. 11,929-30 (1974).
222. 1991 Proposed NYC.E., supra note 3, § 302 cmt., at 35.
223. Id. § 405.
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ments are not hypothetical224 and section 410(d) excludes state-
ments made during criminal plea discussions.225 Section 607(b)
eliminates the ancient "voucher rule" and permits a party to im-
peach his or her own witness.226 Section 804(b)(2) permits the
admission of dying declarations in wrongful death actions as
well as homicide prosecutions.227 These are all changes that
move the law forward and appear to have survived opposition
by the most strident evidence conservatives.
In some areas the code benefits from experience under the
Federal Rules by addressing an overlooked issue, clarifying an
ambiguity or creating an ingenious solution to a problem. For
instance, proposed code section 404(2) expressly permits the use
of character evidence in certain quasi-criminal civil cases, a
growing practice in some federal circuits,228 notwithstanding
the absence of authority for such evidence in the Federal Rules.
The practice has developed because creating an exception to the
general prohibition on character evidence for these civil cases,
analogous to that expressly provided for in criminal cases,
makes sense.
Generally the law does not permit evidence concerning a
person's character to prove he or she acted in a particular way
since its probative value is slight while its prejudicial effect can
be great. While it may be true that people's conduct frequently
conforms to their character traits, human experience tells us
that is not necessarily true in a particular instance. Character
evidence tends to divert attention from what actually happened
on a particular occasion, introducing the possibility that the
factfinder will reward a good person or punish a bad person de-
spite the evidence in the case. However, Federal Rule 404(a)(2)
includes a specific exception for the defendant in a criminal
224. [d. § 408.
225. [d. § 410(d).
226. [d. § 607(b).
227. [d. § 804(b)(2).
228. See, e.g., Hill v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields Inc., 790 F.2d 817, 826
(lOth Cir. 1986) (holding it an error to exclude evidence that plaintiff was not a
rube); Croce v. Bromley Corp., 623 F.2d 1084, 1092 (5th Cir. 1980) (expert testified
that civil defendant's driver was safe which then justified testimony regarding
prior accidents by pilot), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 981 (1981); Gray v. Sherril, 542 F.2d
952, 954 (5th Cir. 1976) (court found no error in admission oftestimony concerning
appellant's character trait of having emotional outbursts and of being
argumentative).
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case.229 This is based on the common law rule that the proba-
tive-prejudice balance is different in a criminal case. Although
knowledge of the defendant's good character may prejudice a
jury in the defendant's favor, the social cost of convicting an in-
nocent person argues for the admissibility of all relevant evi-
dence so the factfinder ought to be able to consider whether a
person of past good character is likely to have committed the
charged offense.23o Like reasoning applies in certain civil cases,
such as fraud, since the quasi-criminal nature of these offenses
has the same potential for destroying a person's reputation and
economic status. The proposed New York code, therefore, per-
mits character evidence in a civil case when the underlying
cause of action is predicated on intentional conduct that violates
the penal law.
The proposed code also clarifies a major ambiguity under
the Federal Rules. Rule 803(3) permits a statement of present
state of mind or emotional or physical condition to be admissible
even though it may be hearsay.231 The theory behind this ex-
ception to the hearsay rule is that the spontaneity and contem-
poraneity of the statement and the state of mind or condition of
the declarant assures its reliability.232 The common law antece-
dent of this rule arose in the famous case of Mutual Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Hillmon. 233
The issue in Hillmon was whether a body recovered on
March 17, 1879, in Crooked Creek, Kansas, was John W.
Hillmon or Frederick Adolph Walters. A letter written by Wal-
ters stating his intention to go to Crooked Creek with John
Hillmon was offered to prove that Walters actually went there.
The Supreme Court held that the statement in Walters's letter,
that he intended to go to Crooked Creek, made it more likely
that he actually did go than if there had been no such state-
ment.234 The primary difficulty that has arisen under this pro-
vision is whether the declarant's statement of intent may be
229. FED. R. EVID. 404(a)(2).
230. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 186 (John William
Strayed., 4th ed. 1992).
231. FED. R. EVID. 803(3).
232. FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note including reference to
803(1).
233. 145 U.S. 285 (1892).
234. Id. at 295-96.
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admitted to show what someone other than the declarant did,
i.e., would Walters's statement be admissible to show what
Hillmon did?235 The legislative history on the issue is un-
clear.236 The majority of courts have admitted such statements
to prove the conduct of other parties despite uniform disap-
proval by commentators.237 The proposed New York code recog-
nizes the danger in the general admissibility of these
statements by setting limits on their use. A declaration of in-
tent to engage in conduct with another to prove the conduct of
another person is admissible only if: the declarant is unavaila-
ble and there are other circumstances that suggest that the
statement of intent was serious; it is likely that someone other
than the declarant would engage in the conduct; and there is
corroboration that the second person actually engaged in the
conduct.238 The proposed New York rule, therefore, improves on
the federal rule both by explicitly addressing an ambiguity and
by creating conditions that enhance the reliability of the admit-
ted evidence.
235. The language used by the Court supports use of such statements to prove
the conduct of another although whether Hillmon went to Crooked Creek was not
really at issue in the case. The court stated:
The letters in question were competent ... as evidence that, shortly before
the time when other evidence tended to show that he went away, he had the
intention of going, and ofgoing with Hillmon, which made it more probable
both that he did go and that he went with Hillmon, than if there had been no
proof of such intention.
Id. (emphasis added).
236. See FED. R. EVID. 803(3) advisory committee's note (the rule ofHillmon is
left undisturbed); H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 13-14 (1973), reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.AN. 7051 (House made clear that statement was not admissible
as to actions of non-declarant).
237. See United States v. Pheaster, 544 F.2d 353, 379-80 (9th Cir. 1976) (vic-
tim intended to meet defendant in parking lot from which he disappeared), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895 (8th Cir.
1975) (deceased intended to discuss ending business dealings with defendant), cert.
denied, 424 U.S. 911 (1976); State v. Abernathy, 577 S.W.2d 591 (Ark. 1979) (vic-
tim intended to meet defendant); State v. Cugliata, 372 A.2d 1019 (Me.) (victim
intended to travel with defendant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 836 (1977), overruled by
State v. Brewer, 505 A2d 774 (Me. 1985); contra, e.g., Clark v. United States, 412
A2d 21 (D.C. 1980) (victim intended to meet defendant at location where she was
killed not admissible). Compare, e.g., Douglas D. McFarland, Dead Men Tell Tales:
Thirty Times Three Years of the Judicial Process After Hillman, 30 VILL. L. REV. 1,
18-27 (1985); John M. Maguire, The Hillman Case-Thirty-three Years After, 38
HARv. L. REV. 709, 715 (1925).
238. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 804(b)(5).
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Probably the most interesting innovation in the current
New York proposal is its solution to the problem of developing
future hearsay exceptions. The Federal Rules addressed this
problem by creating two identical exceptions to the hearsay
rule, commonly called the residual exceptions or catch-aIls,
which permit, with notice to the adverse party, admission of
hearsay statements not covered by other exceptions if they have
other guarantees of trustworthiness and if the court determines
that
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered
than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and
the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
statement into evidence.239
The residual exceptions have been criticized for allowing the ad-
mission of "almost any relevant out-of-court statement that
passes muster under Rule 403."240 The residual exceptions have
been used to admit such arguably unreliable hearsay as: the
grand jury testimony of accomplices;241 telexes from governmen-
tal agencies prepared for use in litigation even though the infor-
mation was contradicted by other evidence;242 statements from
defendant's estranged wife to the FBI that she told her husband
of an outstanding arrest warrant;243 an accomplice's unsworn
statements implicating others even though there was evidence
that the declarant had previously lied to the authorities;244 and
statements that almost, but not quite, qualify under one of the
enumerated exceptions.245
239. FED. R. EVID. 803(24) & 804(5). The only difference between the two pro-
visions is that the availability of the declarant is immaterial to the former and
required by the latter.
240. Jeffery Cole, Residual Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 16 LITIG. 26, 27
(1989); see also Faust Rossi, The Silent Revolution, 9 LITIG. 13, 17 (1983).
241. See, e.g., United States v. Curro, 847 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.>, cert. denied, 488
U.S. 843 (1988).
242. See, e.g., United States v. Doe, 860 F.2d 488 (1st Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
490 U.S. 1049 (1989).
243. See, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 856 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1988).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Roberts, 844 F.2d 537 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 867 (1988).
245. See, e.g., Moffett v. McCauley, 724 F.2d 581 (7th Cir. 1984); United
States v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1350-51 (7th Cir.) (calendars admitted "as
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The proposed New York rule is much more restrictive. In
an effort to provide for further development of the law but pro-
tect against the admission of unreliable evidence, New York's
proposed residual exception only permits hearsay that is
"within a definable category of statements" and that is separate
and distinct from the categories set forth elsewhere.246 The rule
recognizes that the enumerated exceptions do not encompass
every situation that might present reliable hearsay. However,
the drafters did not want to give trial judges broad discretion to
admit any type of hearsay that might appear reliable in a par-
ticular case. The drafters thought that
vesting trial judges with virtually unlimited and unreviewable
discretion to admit so-called reliable hearsay will lead to the ad-
missibility of unreliable evidence, a lack of uniform application,
and most importantly, an absence of meaningful review by the
Court of Appeals which has limited power to review discretionary
determinations, mixed questions of fact and law, and virtually no
power to review factual determinations.247
The code envisions the development of future hearsay excep-
tions such as an exception for learned treatises, but expressly
precludes admission of a statement that almost, but not com-
pletely, meets the requirements of an enumerated exception.248
The proposed New York code expressly provides that these de-
terminations are questions of law, thereby assuring review by
the New York Court of Appeals, and limits applicability of the
residual exception in criminal cases to statements of an un-
available witness, being mindful of constitutional confrontation
concerns.249 All in all, it is an ingenious solution to a difficult
problem.
B. The Arguments Against Codification
Defense lawyers consistently oppose codification. Although
the criminal bar has been the most conspicuous, it has not been
statements 'by a conspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the
conspiracy'"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979).
246. 1991 Proposed N.YC.E., supra note 3, § 806.
247. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 806 cmt., at 233-34.
248. Id. at 234.
249.Id.
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alone.25o The civil defense bar, when identifiable as such, has
also opposed codification.251 Just as modern supporters of codi-
fication renew historical arguments, opponents' arguments mir-
ror those raised by their intellectual and political predecessors.
Opponents make four principal arguments against codifica-
tion. First, there is no need for a code because the present sys-
tem is working and is superior to anything that can be achieved
by codification. Second, codification will freeze the development
of the law. Third, any given proposal vests too much discretion
in the trial judge. Fourth, codification will politicize the law of
evidence.
1. No Need for a Code
Opponents argue that New York has a long and proud tra-
dition of common law development of rules of evidence, and that
the proponents of codification have not established a need for
abandoning the current system.252 Unlike the federal system
before the Federal Rules were enacted, traditionally New York
has not been troubled by inter-circuit and inter-district con-
flicts. The New York Court of Appeals has been a leader in de-
veloping the law253 and opponents of codification find nothing
250. See, e.g., Hearings, Nov. 19,1980, supra note 155, at 290-96 (testimony of
Archibald Murray, on behalf of the Legal Aid Society); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983,
supra note 153, at 287-310 (testimony of Eric Seiff, on behalf of the New York
Criminal Bar Association; Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 130-34 (tes-
timony of Peter McShane, on behalf of the New York State Defenders' Association).
251. See, e.g., Proposed Code ofEvidence for the State ofNew York: Joint Pub-
lic Hearing of the New York State Law Revision Commission, Senate Standing
Committee on the Judiciary, Assembly Standing Committee on the Judiciary, Sen-
ate Standing Committee on Codes and Assembly Standing Committee on Codes, 84-
93 (Nov. 12, 1980) [hereinafter Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980] (testimony of R. William
Larson); id. at 94-117 (testimony of Frank Raichle); id. at 118-27 (testimony of
Alexander Cordes); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 51-71 (testimony of
Jim Furey).
252. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 56 (testimony of Jim Furey,
on behalf of the Tort Reparations Committee of the New York State Bar Associa-
tion); see id. at 245 (testimony of Archibald Murray).
253. See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 5 (statement of She1-
don Silver, Chairman, Assembly Codes Committee); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983,
supra note 153, at 246 (testimony of Archibald Murray); Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980,
supra note 252, at 58 (testimony of Edward Nowak, on behalf of the Public De-
fender of Monroe County).
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unclear254 or inaccessible255 about New York's common law of
evidence. They also maintain that a code with commentary will
be no smaller than Richardson on Evidence256 or Fisch on Evi-
dence. 257 Moreover, every practicing attorney knows where to
find the law of evidence.258 As Judge Phylis Bamberger has ar-
gued, codification may be an extreme remedy for a minor ill:
Finding statutes and relevant cases governing evidentiary princi-
ples is a task no different from finding the statutes and other au-
thorities relevant to any other legal subject. The same tools are
available. It is generally presumed that law school has at least
taught the method for researching the law. If education is the
intent of the proposal, it would be accomplished by simply distrib-
uting the proposal without its enactment by the legislature.259
Opponents also fear codification will result in extensive and
expensive appellate litigation.260 The reasoning is as follows:
the law is now well defined and once the legislature enacts a
code, even one that merely codifies current law, courts will have
to review each rule to decide whether the legislature intended it
to be the same or whether the rule has been changed in some
way. Thus it will be years before the law of evidence is settled
again. 261 Additional drawbacks envisioned by opponents are
254. Hearings Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 163 (testimony ofJoseph Mc-
Carthy); Hearings,. July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 131 (testimony of Peter
McShane, on behalf of New York State Defenders' Association).
255. See Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 39-40, 45 (testimony of
Gerald Lefcourt).
256. RICHARDSON, supra note 165.
257. FISCH, supra note 165.
258. Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 39-40 (testimony of Gerald
Lefcourt); Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 184 (testimony of Edward J.
Hart); Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 163 (testimony of Joseph
McCarthy).
259. Phylis Skoot Bamberger, Let's Think Before We Leap: Why Should the
Law ofEvidence Be Codified?, N.Y. L.J., May 13, 1992, at I, 7.
260. See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 64 (testimony of
Susan Lindenhauer, on behalf of the Legal Aid Society.); id. at 131 (testimony of
Peter McShane, on behalf of the New York State Defenders' Association); Hear-
ings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 197-200 (testimony of Edward J. Hart).
261. See Hearings, Feb. 25,1983, supra note 153, at 185 (testimony of Edward
J. Hart, Chairman of the Tort Reparations Committee of the New York State Bar
Association). Interestingly, the Law Revision Commission has argued that it
would be financially beneficial to enact a code. The cost of retrials as a result of
evidentiary errors that could be eliminated by a code will reduce the waste oftime
currently in the system. [d. at 11-12 (testimony of Carolyn Gentile).
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the expense involved in codification and the time and effort re·
quired to learn the new code. One lawyer has calculated that
learning the new code will consume forty-five years of judges'
time and fifty million dollars' worth of attorney time.262
Opponents assert that proponents have not demonstrated
that trial judges and trial lawyers have difficulty learning and
using the law of evidence263 or that the law needs to be simpli.
fied, modernized or clarified.264 They insist that codification will
actually create many of the problems that its supporters seek to
avoid.265 In some ways they are right. Proponents of any
change have the burden of providing a reasonable basis of
adopting the suggested reform. But to maintain that the law of
evidence in New York is beyond improvement or that it is a sub·
ject that is easily learned and used is clearly wrong.
Codification is not a panacea. Learning the new code will
take time and have its costs. Working with the new code will
raise questions as well as provide answers. No law of evidence
can be specific enough to provide easy, automatic solutions to all
evidence issues. The law of evidence must be flexible enough to
accommodate the enormous variety of situations that real life
presents. Nor will there necessarily be fewer appeals. No new
(or old) body oflaw can avoid appellate litigation. Courts must
interpret the words and reveal the policies behind the rules.
Opponents to codification are correct that the code's text will
not be all there is to the law but that, of course, is true of all
statutory law. Courts will continue to have a role and judicial
opinions will continue to shape the rules.
IDtimately, opponents have overstated the problem. The
current proposal does not create an entirely new body of law
that must be learned and defined. Rather, it codifies the cur-
rent common law unless there is an "express and unequivocal
indication of legislative intent to do" otherwise.266 The cost of
learning the new law is well worth the benefits achieved
through codification. The question is not whether codification
262. Id. at 57-58 (testimony of Jim Furey, Corporate Defense Fund).
263. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
264. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text.
265. See part II.A.
266. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 102.
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will make the law of evidence perfect, only whether it will make
it better. On this proponents have met their burden of proof.
2. Codification Freezes the Law of Evidence
Opponents fear that codification will stop further develop-
ment of evidence law since after codification courts will no
longer be the vehicle for growth and change.267 New privileges,
hearsay exceptions and doctrines not yet dreamed of will no
longer arise from that thoughtful process of slow, case-by-case
consideration by trial and then appellate courts.
Opponents concede that courts will continue to interpret
the law, but point out that judicial consideration of statutory
law is very different from the development of common law.
Common law courts apply judicially-created rules to known
facts and conditions with the hope that justice will be served in
the individual case. Judicial opinions deciding individual cases
are generated by adversarial litigation. Opponents argue that
law that arises from a real dispute between known litigants is
more likely to produce justice. Moreover, common law courts
are virtually unlimited in their power to fashion remedies or
create rules.268
Once the law of evidence is codified, however, different
rules will apply. Courts will not create but only interpret the
law. Such statutory interpretation is limited to a few well-de-
fined principles. If the words of the statute are unambiguous, a
court must enforce the provision.269 If the words of the statute
are ambiguous, a court must seek the intent of the legisla-
ture. 270 Opponents argue that it will no longer be possible for a
court to create new doctrines or abandon outmoded ones.271 If
the legislature had wanted to change the law in certain areas,
so the argument goes, it would have done so. Since it did not,
courts will be more hesitant to make future needed changes. As
a result, the law of evidence will be the poorer.
267. See, e.g., Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 36 (testimony of
Gerald Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense
Attorneys).
268. Bamberger, supra note 260, at 1.
269. N.Y. STAT. LAw § 76 (McKinney 1991).
270. N.Y. STAT. LAw § 92 (McKinney 1991).
271. Bamberger, supra note 260, at 1.
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Further, opponents argue that the law of evidence should
be made by courts and not legislators because "it is largely a
matter of logic and experience. It is based on determining facts
by drawing reasoned inferences from information relevant to
the fact determined."272 This, of course, is what courts do.
Archibald Murray of the Legal Aid Society, a leading oppo-
nent of codification, agrees that the law of evidence ought to be
developed by courts, reasoning it is sui generis, neither substan-
tive nor procedural. Murray concedes that substantive law, be-
cause it must reflect policy considerations, and procedural law,
because it should be clear and uniform, are the job of the legis-
lature.273 The law of evidence, however, does not implicate pub-
lic policy concerns, according to Murray. While general
guidelines are important, Murray argues that the law "must re-
main flexible enough to adapt to the unique factual circum-
stances of each case."274 Murray sees the judiciary as experts in
the trial process and feels that the legislature should intervene
only when public policy or uniformity are important.275
Finally, other opponents argue that codification of the law
ofevidence will further overburden an already stretched legisla-
ture276 that has neither the time nor expertise to monitor prop-
erly the proposed code to guarantee that justice is done.277
Opponents' fear that codification will restrain the development
of the law has merit. After all, the role of the judiciary in inter-
preting a statute is more limited than when it is deciding a case
on common law principles.278 However, the argument is based
on two premises. First, common law development is healthy
272. [d. (citing JAMES THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT COM.
MON LAW 265, 275 (1898».
273. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 246-48 (testimony of Archi-
bald Murray). See also Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 36 (testimony
of Gerald Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State Association of Criminal De-
fense Attorneys); but see id. at 131 (testimony of Peter McShane, on behalf of the
New York State Defenders' Association).
274. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 247 (testimony of Archibald
Murray).
275. [d.
276. See, e.g., Hearings July 24,1990, supra note 154, at 36 (testimony of Ger-
ald Lefcourt on behalf of the New York State Association of Criminal Defense
Attorneys).
277. [d. at 131.
278. Bamberger, supra note 260, at 1.
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and permits the law to mature and grow. Second, once the leg-
islature prescribes the law of evidence, the case-by-case evolu-
tion of the law will cease, stifling growth and change. Both
premises are questionable.
Common law development of the law of evidence has left
much to be desired.279 New York's common law system provides
a classic example of the slow pace of judicial reform.280 For in-
stance, New York is one of seventeen states that continue the
antiquated voucher rule which prohibits a party from impeach-
ing a witness it has called.281 Courts are bound by precedent
and their natural conservatism. Opponents are looking to the
wrong forum if development of the law is their goal.
Of course, codification will prevent common law develop-
ment in some areas. The drafters made choices that will re-
quire legislative action to reverse. For instance, proposed rule
608(b) permits impeachment with prior specific instances of
misconduct that bear on a witness's credibility.282 This lan-
guage is broader than that adopted in Federal Rule 608(b)
which limits such inquiry to prior specific instances of miscon-
279. We end, as we began, with the observation that the law regulating the
offering and testing of character testimony may merit many criticisms. Eng-
land and some states have overhauled the practice by statute. But the task
of modernizing the long-standing rules on the subject is one of magnitude
and difficulty which even those dedicated to law reform do not lightly
undertake.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 485-86 (1948).
280. ALA. CODE § 12-21-163 (1986 & Supp. 1991); ARIZ. R. EVID. 601 (1992);
COLO. R EVID. 601 (1984 & Supp. 1990); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.601 (West 1992);
IDAHO R EVID. 60l(b) (1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-201 (1992); IND. CODE
§ 34-1-14-6 (1992); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 421-210(2) (Baldwin 1992); MD. CODE
ANN. § 19-11-20 (Law. Co-op. 1991); TENN. CODE ANN. § 24-1-203 (1992); TEX. R
CIV. EVID. 60l(b) (1990-1991); VT. R. EVID. 601 (1983 & Supp. 1991); WASH. R
EVID. 601 (1963 & Supp. 1991); W. VA. R. EVID. 601 (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 906.01 (West 1975 & Supp. 1991).
281. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608(2) <West 1979 & Supp. 1992); IDAHO R EVID:
§607 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-14 (Burns 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.487
(West 1967); MASs. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 233 § 23 <West 1959); MICH. R. EVID. 607
(1992); N.J. R. EVID. 20 (1976 & Supp. 1992); OHIO R. EVID. 607 (1992); VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-403 (Michie 1992); Castillow v. Browning Ferris Indus., 591 So. 2d 43'
(Ala. 1991); State v. Smith, 82 A.2d 816 (Conn. 1951); Poole v. State, 428 A.2d 434
(Md. 1981); Hall v. State, 165 So. 2d 345 (Miss. 1964); Commonwealth v. Brady,
507 A.2d 66 (Pa. 1986); State v. Gomes, 604 A.2d 1249 (RI. 1992); State v. Ander-
son, 406 S.E.2d 152 (S.C. 1991).
282. 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 608(b).
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duct that bear on the truthfulness of the testimony.283 The code
has been criticized for adopting what is a minority position.284
It is correct that the choice to retain New York's common law
rule forecloses any hope of the New York Court of Appeals re-
versing its long-held position in this area.285 The price of codifi-
cation is that in some circumstances courts will not be the
vehicle for change. This does not mean that the law can never
change. But in these areas, it will have to be the legislature
that acts.
Despite these substantive choices and the shift to the legis-
lature as the final decisionmaker, the code will not stop the de-
velopment oflaw. There will still be judicial opinions that move
the policy or operation of a provision forward incrementally. In-
evitably there also will be decisions that consider novel ques-
tions. As new evidentiary questions arise, courts will decide
them. Codification will not stop this process.
Since the Federal Rules were adopted, courts have contin-
ued to develop the law of evidence in all of these ways. For ex-
ample, in Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey286 the Court made new
law based on policy considerations. There, the Court considered
for the first time whether the exception to the hearsay rule for
public investigatory reports (803(8)(C» includes conclusions or
opinions contained in the reports.287 After determining that
neither the language of the rule288 nor the legislative history289
was dispositive, the Court considered the policy behind the
Rule's "general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to
'opinion' testimony"290 coupled with the practical difficulty of
283. FED. R. EVID. 608(b)(l).
284. Professor Bennett L. Gershman, Address at the New York State Bar As-
sociation Criminal Justice Section Annual Meeting (Jan. 30, 1992).
285. See People v. Sorge, 301 N.Y. 198,93 N.E.2d 637 (1950). However, there
is no reason to think that the court of appeals was likely to make this change. In
People v. Betts, 70 N.Y.2d 289, 514 N.E.2d 865, 520 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1987), the de-
fendant sought to have the court reconsider its rule. The court responded: "Our
holding today neither retreats from the precise holding [in Sorge] nor casts the
slightest doubt on the correctness of the more general evidentiary principle it con-
firms." Id. at 293-94, 514 N.E.2d at 869-70,520 N.Y.S.2d at 374-75.
286. 488 U.S. 153 (1988).
287.Id.
288. Id. at 163-64.
289. Id. at 164-65.
290. Id. at 169.
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drawing a clear line between fact and opinion,291 and admitted
the opinion.
Common law courts sometimes make law when they con-
sider how a rule ought to operate, such as establishing the ap-
propriate burden of proof for admitting a contested evidentiary
fact. 292 Courts will do the same kind oflaw-making after codifi-
cation. Huddleston u. United States293 is an example of judicial
resolution of such a procedural rule. Like the common law, Fed-
eral Rule 404 generally prohibits the admission ofcharacter evi-
dence suggesting that a person will or did act in a certain way
because the person acted that way in the past.294 As does the
common law, the Federal Rules recognize. that such evidence
might be admissible for some purposes.295 The rule does not
specify what degree of proof of prior acts is required or whether
the court or the jury is to decide the point. In Huddleston the
Supreme Court held that the trial court need not decide
whether "the government has proved the act by a preponder-
ance of the evidence" but need only consider "whether the jury
could reasonably find the conditional fact . . . by a preponder-
ance of the evidence."296 This contrasted with the overwhelm-
ing majority of circuit courts which had held that the
substantive question was for the court and the burden of proof
291. Id. at 168.
292. See, e.g., People v. Robinson, 68 N.Y.2d 541, 503 N.E.2d 485, 510
N.Y.S.2d 837 (1986) (defendant's commission of an uncharged crime must be
proven by clear and convincing evidence before it can be offered on the issue of
identity in a prosecution for an unrelated offense).
293. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
294. Professor Jonakait has argued that Huddleston is an example of limita-
tion codification places on judicial law-making. Randolph N. Jonakait, Plain
Meaning and the Changed Rules ofEvidence, 68 TEX. L. REV. 745, 752-55 (1990).
He argues that the Court in Huddleston felt constrained by the plain meaning of
the statute and the intent of the drafters to reject a rule that would better serve
federal evidence policy. Id. at 755. Without disagreeing with Professor Jonakait
on the merits of the rule actually adopted, I think he argues from wishful thinking.
There is nothing in Huddleston that suggests that the Court was not completely
satisfied with the rule articulated or would have adopted some other rule if left to
its own devices. Although the Court does evaluate the issues using traditional
statutory construction criteria, the Court clarified a procedural rule and made law
by concluding that the adopted standard conformed to the policy structure behind
the Federal Rules.
295. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
296. 485 U.S. at 689·90.
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was by clear and convincing evidence.297 Although Huddleston
has been criticized298 and was rejected by the drafters of the
proposed New York code, it illustrates a court developing law
under a code.
The greatest need for growth of the law arises when devel-
opments in society present new legal problems. For example,
the use of hypnotism to refresh a witness's testimony only has
become an issue since the enactment of the Federal Rules.
There is no provision in the Federal Rules that explicitly ad-
dresses the admissibility of such testimony. Rule 601 provides
that "[e]very person is competent to be a witness."299 Since hyp-
notically refreshed testimony simply was not an issue when the
Federal Rules were being considered, neither the plain meaning
of the rule not its legislative history suggest a basis for exclud-
ing this type of testimony. Yet codification has not prevented
courts from creating new rules to deal with new problems. The
majority of federal courts apply a balancing approach, permit-
ting the witness to testify if the in-court testimony of a previ-
ously hypnotized witness has a basis that is independent of
hypnotic influence.30o Regardless of whether one agrees with
the particular rule courts have created, it is clear that codifica-
tion has not stunted the law's growth or the court's ability to
deal with this new situation.
Even conceding that courts will be unable to act in certain
ways once the law is codified, there is no reason to think that
the law of evidence cannot be changed or amended by the legis-
lature. Legislatures are far more responsive in the first place to
the need for change than are courts. Judicial change requires a
case with the right issue, a party who recognizes it and a court
297. See Manning v. Rose, 507 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1974); United States v.
O'Brien, 618 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Fredrickson, 601 F.2d
1358 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Herrera-Medina, 609 F.2d 376 (9th Cir.
1977).
298. See, e.g., Dale A. Nance, Conditional Relevance Reinterpreted, 70 B.U. L.
REV. 447, 498-505 (1990); Abraham P. Ordover, Balancing the presumptions of
Guilt and Innocence: Rules 404(b) 608(b) and 609(a), 38 EMORY L. J. 135 (1989).
299. FED. R. EVID. 60l.
300. Victor J. Gold, Do the Federal Rules ofEvidence Matter?, 25 Loy. L.A. L.
REV. 909, 915 (1972). See, e.g., United States v. Kimberlin, 805 F.2d 210,219 (7th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1023 (1987); Harker v. Maryland, 800 F.2d 437,
441 (4th Cir. 1986); Wicker v. McCotter, 783 F.2d 487, 492 (5th Cir.>, cert. denied,
478 U.S. 1010 (1986).
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that is willing to risk an unprecedented ruling. Additionally,
the dispute must be important enough or, in civil cases, the par-
ties rich enough to appeal. Even if those conditions are satis-
fied, there is no assurance that the litigation will produce the
desired change.
By contrast, genuine problems in the law can be taken to
the legislature and dealt with directly. In 1978, Congress re-
sponded to just such a problem. Rule 412, frequently called the
rape-shield law, was added to the Federal Rules, precluding the
routine admissibility of a rape victim's prior sexual conduct in
prosecutions for sex offenses.301 The rule was enacted to en-
courage reform of existing rape laws.302 During the discussion
in the House of Representatives, Representative Mann argued:
Mr. Speaker, for many years in this country, evidentiary rules
have permitted the introduction of evidence about a rape victim's
prior sexual conduct. . .. Such evidence quite often serves no real
purpose and only results in embarrassment to the rape victim and
unwarranted public intrusion into her private life. The eviden-
tiary rules that permit such inquiry have in recent years come
under question; and the States have taken the lead to change and
modernize their evidentiary rules. . .. The bill before us similarly
seeks to modernize the Federal evidentiary rules.303
Similar provisions have been adopted in most states, including
New York.304 No state developed this doctrine by case law.
Codification will not prohibit the law from developing.
Courts will continue moving in their traditional incremental
fashion, permitting the law to grow and change. When the com-
mon law process is inadequate, the legislature can act again.
3. Codification Permits Excessive Judicial Discretion
One of the more paradoxical objections to codification is the
fear of judicial discretion, since such an objection directly con-
tradicts the claim that evidence law should be made by judges
with their special expertise. All of the modern codifications
301. Pub. L. No. 95-540, § 2(2), Oct. 28, 1978.
302. TRIAL EVIDENCE COMMITIEE, EMERGING PROBLEMS UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE 71 (2d ed. 1991).
303. 124 CONGo REC. 34,912 (1978).
304. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.42 (McKinney 1992); see also IDAHO
R. EVID. 412 (1991); ME. RULES OF COURT § 412 (West 1992); MISS. R. EVID. 13-1-
412 (1992).
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adapted from the Federal Rules of Evidence give a significant
amount of discretion to trial judges. The drafters of the Federal
Rules included broad discretionary rules to allow for continued
development in the law. They feared that non-discretionary ev-
idence rules would preclude further growth and prevent on-the-
spot flexible decisionmaking that the trial process requires.305
In fact, the argument has been made that the Federal Rules are
misnamed and that "[t]he drafters of the Federal Rules did not
consider them as rigid rules to be mechanically applied, but
rather. as flexible principles for both trial and appellate
courts."306
Opponents of the current New York proposal have not ex-
pressed the same level of concern about judicial discretion as
they have about previous drafts,307 which frequently were criti-
cized for removing predictability and guidance by giving too
much discretion to trial courts.308 Critics perceived the trial
bench as so poor as to require explicit rules to prevent errors.309
Further, such errors would be very difficult to correct since ap-
pellate courts, which rarely write evidence opinions in the first
place, would feel even more constrained if the standard of re-
view were abuse of discretion rather than the higher de novo
standard applicable to statutory interpretation.310
Articulated objections about the scope of judicial discretion
in the proposed code seem to mask a deeper concern about the
305. See Margaret A. Berger, An Introduction to the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 2 LITIG. 8 (1975); see generally Craig Spangenberg, The Federal Rules of
Evidence-Attempt at Uniformity in Federal Courts, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 1061 (1969).
306. Thoinas Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, 74 IOWA L. REv. 413, 415 (1989).
307. The current movement away from this objection is probably the result of
the current code's having been redrafted to reflect existing New York law, which
does not permit the admission of as much evidence and a recognition of the some-
what schizophrenic nature of the argument.
308. See, e.g, Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 96, 102 (testimony of
Frank Raichle); Hearings Nov. 19, 1980, supra note 155, at 528 (testimony of Eric
Sieff, on behalf of the New York Criminal Bar Association); Hearings, Feb. 25,
1983, supra note 153, at 60 (testimony of Jim Furey); Hearings, March 2, 1983,
supra note 155, at 63 (testimony of Jim Hartman).
309. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 296 (testimony of Eric Seifl);
Hearings, Nov. 12, 1980, supra note 252, at 97,102 (testimony of Frank Raichle).
310. Hearings, Feb. 25, 1983, supra note 153, at 297-98 (testimony of Eric
Seifl); cf. Hearings, Mar. 2, 1983, supra note 155, at 64 (testimony of Jim
Hartman).
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result of that discretion's exercise. For instance, the Legal Aid
Society has most recently argued that
[t]o the extent that the draft considers the problem ofjudicial dis-
cretion, in our view it oscillates between forbidding any judicial
development ... [and] granting an ill-defined and overbroad lati-
tude through the use of a catchall provision in the hearsay article.
Beyond this, at least three provisions of the proposed code appear
to increase the likelihood of judicial involvement in the presenta-
tion of evidence at trial. . . . These various provisions encourage
judicial intervention in the evidentiary process without providing
adequate recognition of the dangers of that intrusion, the weaken-
ing of the adversary system, the displacement of the jury as the
finder offact and the loss of appearance ofjudicial impartiality.311
This concern was expressed in the context of a much larger
and more general theme that runs throughout the Legal Aid po-
sition, i.e., that "the drafters have opted for admissibility over
reliability."312 For opponents of codification who, as defendants'
attorneys, are often trying to keep evidence from being admit-
ted, the increase in admissibility associated with increased judi-
cial discretion is a serious problem. The preference for common
law development reflects a belief that without a code the mod-
ern trend toward admitting more evidence can at least be
contained.
This same concern was one of the objections expressed
when the Federal Rules were enacted and was repeated as
states adopted codes based on the federal mode1.313 Grants of
discretion have been equated with increased admissibility. As
one commentator described it:
Three words describe the direction in which the Federal Rules of
Evidence have taken us: discretion, creativity, and admissibility.
The codes give abundant discretionary power to the trial courts.
The judges add a sizable measure of interpretive creativity.
Greater admissibility has resulted.314
311. Hearings, July 24, 1991, supra note 154, at 70. The provisions are sec-
tions 201, 611(a) and 614(a) & (b).
312. Id. at 69 (testimony of Susan Lindenauer).
313. See, e.g., Paul F. Rothstein, Some Themes in the Proposed Federal Rules
of Evidence, 33 FED. B. J. 21, 29-30 (1974); Richard S. Walinski & Howard
Abramoff, The Proposed Ohio Rules of Evidence: The Case Against, 28 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 344, 367-86 (1978).
314. See Rossi, supra note 241, at 13.
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That codification along the federal model has broadened admis-
sibility is not seriously debated.3l5 But at the same time, the
modern trend in evidence well before the Federal Rules has
been toward greater admissibility.3l6 The historical exclusion-
ary rules reflected the nineteenth century distrust of the jury
and were established to keep unreliable and misleading evi-
dence from the jury's consideration.3l7 As respect for the jury's
ability to evaluate evidence has increased, the desire to protect
jurors from potentially unreliable evidence has declined.31B
The criminal defense bar opposes codification because it
thinks that increased admissibility will work against its clients.
As one commentator has noted, this is probably true in two
respects:
(1) It makes it more difficult for the defense to rely on the prosecu-
tion's inability to meet its burden. Greater admissibility means it
is easier to put in evidence to meet the burden.
(2) A cutting down of exclusionary principles hurts the defense
because some judges administer exclusionary rules in a way
favorable to the defense. These judges exclude prosecution evi-
dence but not defense evidence because only exclusion of defense
evidence or admission of prosecution evidence carries any risk of
reversal, owing to the fact that no appeal lies by the
prosecution.3 l 9
The defense bar's concern is understandable, particularly in
light of the dramatic increase in the power of the American
315. See, e.g" Rothstein, supra note 314, at 21 (perhaps the predominant
theme is a "bias in favor of admissibility"); Jon R. Waltz, Judicial Discretion in the
Admission of Evidence Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 79 Nw. U. L. REV.
1097, 1118 (1985) ("[M]ore evidentiary material is being turned over to the
factfinder under the Federal Rules of Evidence than would have been in cases tried
at common law."); but see Thomas M. Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA L. REV. 413, 413 (1989) ("Given a decent
amount of flexibility, a trial judge may exclude-as easily as admit-evidence.").
316. Charles T. McCormick, Tomorrow's Law of Evidence, 24 A.B.A. J. 507,
580-81 (1938); Edmund M. Morgan, Some Observations Concerning a Model Code
ofEvidence, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 145,155,161 (1940); Edmund M. Morgan & John M.
Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REV. 909, 923,
931 (1940); Mason Ladd. Modern Thinking Upon Evidence-A Model Code, 17
TENN. L. REV. 10, 12, 20 (1941).
317. Ladd, supra note 317, at 216.
318. Jack Weinstein, The Ohio and Federal Rules of Evidence, 6 CAP. U.L.
REV. 517, 522-23 (1977); 1 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEIN.
STEIN'S EVIDENCE iii (1990).
319. Rothstein, supra note 314, at 26.
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prosecutor in recent years320 which has enlarged the role of the
trial as the final bulwark against government overzealousness.
Now, more than ever, the reliability of admitted evidence must
be guaranteed.
Although the argument has merit, other considerations
make it less persuasive. The combination of a trend in the law
of evidence away from protecting the accused and the move-
ment toward greater admissibility of evidence, even without
codification, suggests that the criminal defense bar cannot pro-
tect itself by defeating codification alone. The judicial trend
against the criminal defendant is obvious. Rising public con-
cern about crime has manifested itself in a growing victim's
rights movement that has reduced judicial protection of the ac-
cused.321 This trend was apparent in the Supreme Court even
before enactment of the Federal Rules322 and continues with in-
creased momentum today.323 Lower courts are even more sensi-
tive to public pressure: there is little that is more disconcerting
to a trial judge than to find his or her name on the front page of
the local paper because of a pro-defendant decision.
Public concern with crime is not the only influence on the
law of evidence. New York's common law system already has
been greatly affected by the Federal Rules, even without codifi-
320. Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PrIT. L. REV. 393
(1992).
321. See, e.g., Eleanor Swift, Does it Matter Who is in Charge of Evidence
Law?, 25 Loy. LA L. REV. 649, 658 (1992) (discussing the effect the victim's rights
movement has had on criminal defendants in California).
322. See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right to counsel at line-
ups required only after indictment); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972) (govern-
ment must prove confession was voluntary only by a preponderance of the evidence
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972)
(approving non-unanimous verdicts.)
323. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991) (involuntary con-
fession can be harnIless error); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (good
faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule); New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649 (1984) (public safety exception to Miranda). New York courts have
been more protective of defendant's interests. See, e.g., People v. Griminger, 71
N.Y.2d 635, 524 N.E.2d 409, 529 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1988) (refusing to adopt the
Supreme Court standard for probable cause); People v. Bigelow, 66 N.Y.2d 417,
488 N.E.2d 451, 497 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1985) (rejecting good faith exception); People v.
Hobson, 39 N.Y.2d 479, 348 N.E.2d 894, 384 N.Y.S.2d 419 (1976) (New York pro-
vides greater protection to defendant's right to counsel than the federal
Constitution).
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cation.324 The trend toward admissibility reflected in the Fed-
eral Rules is very much a part of New York's common law.325
New York courts frequently cite the Federal Rules when decid-
ing evidence questions.326 For instance, the Second Department
of the Appellate Division recently decided that a lay witness
who had not been an eyewitness to the crime could express his
opinion that an individual depicted in a photograph was the de-
fendan~. The court stated:
Although no New York cases directly stand for the proposition
that non-eyewitnesses may be called on the People's direct case to
identify the defendant from a photograph of the crime scene, in a
.number of federal and State jurisdictions such testimony has
been allowed, albeit in some instances in reliance upon general
statutory provisions which expressly permit lay witnesses to
render an opinion with respect to the determination of a fact in
issue. Many of the State statutes are modeled after Federal Rules
of Evidence rule 701 ....327
This trend toward admissibility even includes the development
of new exceptions to the hearsay rule. The New York Court of
Appeals has recently recognized a present sense impression ex-
ception to the rule against hearsay, relying on the Federal
Rules.328 .
Admittedly, the common law of New York is currently less
liberal than that under the Federal Rules. Yet whether or not
New York codifies its law of evidence, the bias toward admissi-
bility is here to stay. Ironically, if there is a hope for reducing
324. See, e.g, Borden·v. Brady, 92 AD.2d 983, 984, 461 N.Y.S.2d 497,498 (3d
Dep't 1983) (Yesawich, J., concurring) ("By permitting reliable but otherwise inad-
missible data to serve as a basis for an expert's opinion, the [C]ourt [of Appeals]
was harmonizing the New York law of evidence with the Federal rule now found in
rule 703 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.").
325. See, e.g., People v. Arnold, 34 N.Y.2d 458, 459, 309 N.E.2d 875, 876, 354
N.Y.S.2d 106, 107 (1974) ("[l]t is observed that this court has in recent years em-
phasized that the hearsay doctrine has been too restrictively applied to exclude
otherwise reliable evidence from the jury."); People v. Miller, 39 N.Y.2d 543, 349
N.E.2d 841, 384 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1976) (modifying New York rule to permit admis-
sion of specific acts of violence on issue of justification in homicide prosecution).
326. See, e.g., People v. Settles, 46 N.Y.2d 154, 169,385 N.E.2d 612, 620, 412
N.Y.S.2d 874, 883 (1978); People v. Watson, 100 AD.2d 452, 464, 474 N.Y.S.2d
978, 986 (2d Dep't 1984).
327. People v. Russell, 165 AD.2d 327, 332, 567 N.Y.S.2d 548, 551 (2d Dep't
1991), affd, 79 N.Y.2d 1024, 594 N.E.2d 922, 584 N.Y.S.2d 428 (1992).
328. People v. Brown, No. 34, 1993 N.Y. LEXIS 91 (N.Y. Feb. 18, 1993).
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the effect of this liberalization movement, it may be in the pro-
cess of codification itself. The current draft both retains many
of the provisions helpful to the criminal defense bar329 and of-
fers some improvements over current law.330 One of the code's
more important innovations is rule 803(c)(iii), which permits a
party to argue against admissibility of an otherwise admissible
hearsay statement because it is not sufficiently trustworthy.
This provision permits courts to exercise discretion in limiting
admissibility and thus offers the defense bar the opportunity to
use its adversary skills in a broad range of circumstances.331
Additionally, a persuasive argument can be made for a number
of innovations or improvements that actually help the criminal
defendant. It may be that the drafters would welcome genuine
efforts to improve the law if the defense bar were serious about
considering a code and engaged in the negotiation process with
the view of ultimately supporting codification.332
4. Codification Politicizes the Law ofEvidence
Finally, there exists the fear that codification will subject
the law of evidence to political influences which will almost cer-
tainly hurt the criminal defendant. No matter how good an en-
329. See, e.g., 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 104(b)(2)(C) (requiring
that before a co-conspirator's statement can be admissible, the prosecution must
prove the existence of the conspiracy without the benefit of the statement itself in
contrast to the Supreme Court's holding in Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S.
171 (1987) and section 104(b)(3)(A), which provides for a higher standard of proof
before uncharged crime evidence can be offered than is currently required under
the Federal Rules.). See Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
330. See, e.g., 1991 Proposed N.Y.C.E., supra note 3, § 404(b)(l) & (b)(2). They
require the offering party to give notice of uncharged crimes evidence before it can
be admitted; and section 410 prohibits the admission of statements made during
plea negotiations.
331. See, e.g., Untied States v. DiMaria, 727 F.2d 265, 271 (2d Cir. 1984).
332. For instance, Professor Robert Pitler, the principal author of the current
proposal, has indicated that any future drafts of the proposed code would include
an amendment to rule 403. The rule currently provides for exclusion of relevant
evidence if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that its
admission would create undue prejudice to a party . . . ." Professor Pitler is pre-
pared to delete the word "substantially", reasoning that evidence which would cre-
ate undue prejudice simply ought not to be admitted whether the prejudice is
substantial or not. Professor Pitler has been convinced of the wisdom of this
change through discussions with Professor Randolf Jonakait, Professor of Law at
New York Law School, a long time opponent of codification. Telephone conversa-
tion with Professor Robert Pitler (Sept. 1, 1992).
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acted code of evidence, the argument goes, within no time the
legislature will riddle it with piecemeal amendments.
The Legislature, whose members must stand for election every
two years, would be even more likely than the courts as a result of
a strong District Attorney lobby to do what is perceived as politi-
cally popular-which generally coincides with the prosecution's
point of view-rather than purely what best serves truth-finding
and the ends of justice.333
In other words, the defense bar fears that prosecutors will lobby
Albany annually and will succeed in changing the law of evi-
dence to increase admissibility at the expense of reliability.334
Worse is the fear that the legislature will respond to every
unpopular verdict. The argument was most directly made by
attorney Gerald Lefcourt, speaking for the New York State As-
sociation of Criminal Defense Lawyers in his prepared state-
ment for the joint public hearings on the proposed code:
Unfortunately, the legislature by its nature and obligations can-
not be as immune [as courts] to public opinion. This Association
fears that making evidentiary rule-making the business of the
legislature will inevitably infect the process with political cur-
rents. Legislators re-elected every two years will understandably
be influenced by public opinion and the interests of their constitu-
ents. Just as every year there are dozens of proposals to enhance
sentences and create new crime in response to public opinion, we
see a future of countless annual proposals to change evidentiary
rules in response to unpopular cases and judicial rulings. We fear
annual lobbying days with pressure placed on legislators to enact
rules simply to make convictions easier or circumvent Court of
Appeals decisions disfavored by law enforcement or other groups.
We see the threat of labeling lawmakers "soft on crime" for oppos-
ing these efforts.335
Lawyers who represent those accused of crime believe they have
a better chance in a courtroom before a single judge than they
333. Hearings, July 24, 1990, supra note 154, at 131-32 (testimony of Peter
McShane, on behalf of New York State Defenders' Association).
334. Id. at 36-38 (testimony of Gerald Lefcourt).
335. Id. at 9 (testimony of Gerald Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers) (on file with the author).
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could possibly have before the legislature.336 After all, criminal
defense lawyers do not represent a group that is either powerful
or popular. They do not trust the legislature to protect their
clients from the growing victims' rights movement they believe
is tilting the scales against the criminal defendant as the move-
ment increases the visibility and power of the crime victim.337
The criminal defense bar's fear that the law of evidence will
become hostage to public opinion is the most pervasive and in
some ways persuasive argument against codification. Although
the argument has an emotional ring to it, it is not irrational.
Legislatures do act in response to public pressure. Criminal de-
fendants do not have a lobby in the legislature. In New York, in
particular, crime is a primary political concern.338 For example,
in 1978, the legislature passed the Juvenile Offender Act339
without public debate in special session340 during an election
year in the wake of a sensationally publicized murder commit-
ted by a fifteen-year-old boy.341 The Act dramatically altered
New York's approach to the administration of juvenile justice,
making it one of only ten states that vested original jurisdiction
over very young teenagers in criminal COurtS.342
336. Id. at 36 (testimony of Gerald Lefcourt, on behalf of the New York State
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers); id. at 132 (testimony of Peter McShane,
on behalf of the New York State Defenders' Association).
337. Swift, supra note 322, at 657-60. Ironically, these same lawyers believe
deeply that judges, too, favor the prosecution. Yet their confidence in their own
persuasiveness makes them more comfortable in a forum where they individually
have a voice.
338. See State of the State Message of Governor Mario Cuomo for 1990 &
1991, reprinted in 1990 N.Y. Laws 2544, 2545, 2559 (McKinney); 1991 N.Y. Laws
2110, 2191 (McKinney).
339. 1978 N.Y. Laws 869 (McKinney).
340. Mara Thorpe, A Critical Perspective, 15 TRIAL 27, 29 (Jan. 1979).
341. In July, 1978, Willie Boskett killed two subway passengers and at-
tempted to kill a subway motorman. Prosecuted as a juvenile delinquent, the only
alternative at the time, Boskett was sentenced to five years in a Division for Youth
Facility. The Boskett case made front page news and the legislature was under a
great deal of public and political pressure to enact a tougher New York juvenile
crime law. The Juvenile Offender Act was passed a few days after Boskett was
sentenced. Harlan A. Levy, Violent Juveniles: The New York Courts and the Con-
stitution, 11 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 51, 52 (1980). See Richard J. Meislin, Ca-
rey, In Shift, Backs Trial In Adult Court For Some Juveniles, N.Y. TIMES, June 30,
1978, at Al (the second headline read: "Discloses Stand Following 5-year Sentence
Given to Youth, 15, for 2 Subway Murders").
342. Barbara Salken, Down the Up Staircase: Due Process and Removal from
Criminal Court, 26 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 643,670-72 (1981).
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The New Jersey legislature recently reacted to a horrified
public in exactly the way opponents fear. Arthur Seale was
charged with the lurid kidnapping murder of Exxon executive
Sidney Reso. Seale's wife, Irene, pleaded guilty and agreed to
testify against her husband. However, New Jersey retained a
restrictive spousal immunity privilege.343 Although the prose-
cutor thought he could secure a conviction without Mrs. Seale's
testimony, he went to Trenton and introduced a bill to modify
the statute.344 A week later the bill was passed.345
The Federal Rules have not been immune to this phenome-
non. In 1984, after John Hinkley was acquitted, by reason of
insanity, of try to kill President Reagan, Congress amended
Federal Rule 704. Rule 704 had abolished the common law rule
that prohibited experts from commenting on the ultimate issue
in a case.346 Prompted by public reaction to the jury's verdict,
Congress resurrected the restriction for experts testifying with
respect to the mental state or condition of a defendant in a crim-
inal case.347
It thus is valid to question whether these notorious exam-
ples warrant abandoning the codification effort. Yet closer look
at the experience in the states suggests not. Ten of the thirty-
four states that have codified their law after the Federal Rules
have done so by legislative enactment.348 The following discus-
343. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84-17(2) (Rule 23).
344. Henry Gottlieb, Murphy's Law: A Nebraska Professor and a Senator Are
Helping the Prosecutor in the Reso Case, 131 N.J. L.J., July 13, 1992, at 1.
345. Henry Gottlieb, Seal Gets New Lawyer, Again, 131 N.J. L.J., July 27,
1992, at 8. .
346. This rule was premised on the notion that opinions on an issue that
might be decisive of the outcome of a dispute invaded the province of the jury. The
rule proved to be unworkable and was condemned by legal scholars and judges. See
WEINSTEIN & BERGER, supra note 196, § 704 [01].
347. Reform of the Federal Insanity Defense: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.
150-93 (1983), cited in Anne Lawsor Braswell, Note, Resurrection of the Ultimate
Issue Rule: Federal Rule ofEvidence 704(b) and the Insanity Defense, 72 CORNELL
L. REV. 620, 620 n.1 (1987).
348. Act ofApr. 13, 1987, No. 876, 1987 Ark. Acts 2096; Act of June 23, 1976,
1976 Fla. Laws ch. 76-237, 1976 Fla. Laws ch. 556; Act of 1980, No. 1827·80, 1980
Haw. Sess. Laws 244; Act ofJan. 28, 1983, ch. 219, 1983 Iowa Acts 713; Act ofJuly
8, 1988, No. 515, 1988 La. Acts 1085; Act ofMay 22, 1975, No. 279, 1975 Neb. Laws
528; Act ofApr. 22, 1971, ch. 402, 1971 Nev. Stat. 775; Act of July 7, 1973, ch. 701,
1973 N.C. Sess. Laws 666; Act of May 10, 1978, ch. 285, 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws
801; Act of Aug. 22, 1981, ch. 892, 1981 Or. Laws 1374. In the remaining twenty-
61
232 PACE LAW REVIEW [Tribute
sion is limited to those ten states in which the legislature was
responsible for the enactment of, and therefore amendment to,
the rules of evidence.349
With the exception of Nevada350 the rules of evidence were
amended rarely: Louisiana and North Carolina have amended
none of their provisions;351 Arkansas and Hawaii have one
amendment each;352 Oklahoma has four amendments;353 Iowa
five;354 Nebraska six;355 Florida356 and Oregon fifteen and four-
four states, the law of evidence was codified by judicial promulgation. See, e.g., 7B
C.R.S. Rules of Evidence 651 (1980 & Supp. 1990); 50 M.S.A., Evid. 3 (1980 &
Supp. 1991) and 17A A.RB. Rules of Evid. 3 (1980 & Supp. 1991). Since there are
restraints on the power of the legislatures to amend the rules in at least some of
those jurisdictions, analogy to New York is inappropriate. See, e.g., Drumm v.
Commonwealth, 783 S.W.2d 380 (Ky. 1990) (striking down KRS 421.355 which had
created an exception to the hearsay rule for child witnesses as usurping the power
of the judiciary to control procedure).
349. In addition to these 10 states that legislatively enacted their evidence
laws, I have also looked at the evidence codes of Alabama, Arizona, Mississippi,
Colorado, Delaware, Kansas, Michigan and Minnesota. I found no better evidence
to support the "legislature run amok" theory in those states.
350. See infra notes 362-64 and accompanying test.
351. See LA. CODE EVID. ANN. (1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8C-1 (1988).
352. ARK. R. EVID. 803(25) (1985 & Supp. 1992) (Arkansas added a new excep-
tion for child witnesses to its rule against hearsay, rule 803(25»; HAw. R. EVID.
408 (1989 & Supp. 1992) (Hawaii amended rule 408 to include statements made
during mediation proceedings as inadmissible evidence); HAw. REV. STAT. § 23G-
15(8) (1985) (Hawaii made gender terms neutral when such changes would not
alter the meaning of the statute).
353. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2103 (1986 amendment corrects a typographi-
cal error), § 2503 (1980 amendment alters limitation on doctor-patient privilege
where patient relies on medical condition as an element of his claim or defense),
§ 2615 (1988 amendment prevents exclusion of the victim of crime from court-
room), § 2803.1 (amendment creates an exception to the hearsay rule for state-
ments of child victims of sex crimes) (West 1978 & Supp. 1992).
354. In 1985, Iowa Rules 601, 611 and 803 were amended; in 1987, Iowa Rule
410 was amended and in 1990, Iowa Rule 601 was amended a second time.
355. In 1978, Nebraska amended Rule 407 to include manufacture or sale of a
defective product in its definition of negligence [Laws 1978, LB 665, § 7] NEB. REV.
STAT. § 27-407 (1985). In 1982, Nebraska amended Rule 705 to delete a provision
that provided for interrogatories for expert witnesses in civil matters. [Laws 1982,
LB 716, § 2.] NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-705 (1985). In 1984, Nebraska amended Rule
404 to prohibit the use of reputation or opinion evidence of the past sexual behav-
ior of the victim of a sexual assault [Laws 1984, LB 79, § 2] NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-
404 (1985); it amended Rule 505, its marital privilege, to permit a spouse to testify
against the other spouse in any criminal case where the crime charged is a crime of
violence [Laws 1984, LB 696, § 1] NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-505 (1985); and it amended
Rule 1101 concerning the courts in which the Rules are applicable [Laws 1984, LB
13, § 46] NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-1101 (1985). In 1988, Nebraska amended Rule 504,
its doctor-patient privilege, to make clear that communications between patient
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teen respectively.357 A code's age has something to do with the
and doctor are not privileged as to obtaining controlled substances unlawfully.
[Laws 1988, LB 273, § 1 and LB 790, § 1] NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-504 (Supp. 1992).
356. In 1981, Florida amended Rule 509 to protect communications that were
privileged when made but were not covered by the code. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.509
(West 1979 & Supp. 1992). Rule 606(3) was amended to change the wording but
not the substance regarding interpreters for deaf persons. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.606 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). Rule 801 expanded the definition of hearsay.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.801 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). In 1983, Rule 503(5) was
added creating a sexual assault-counselor privilege. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503
(West 1979 & Supp. 1992). In 1985, there were minor changes to Rule 605 (deleted
the term "young" in front of the word child and inserted "or the duty not to lie").
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.605 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). Rule 606 was expanded to
provide interpreters to children and mentally or developmentally disabled persons
as well as non-English speaking persons. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.606 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1992). Rule 803(23) was added creating a new hearsay exception for child
witnesses. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). In 1988, rule 602
was technically modified creating a change in the dead man's statute substituting
the term "mentally incompetent" for the formerly used term insane. FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 90.602 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). The remaining seven changes, all
adopted in 1990 include: expanding the definition of psychologist in Rule 503 to
include employees of certain state facilities, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979
& Supp. 1992); amending Rule 404 to allow the accused to otTer evidence of perti-
nent character traits of the victim, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.404 (West 1979 & Supp.
1992); rewording Rule 606(8) to allow reasonable interpretation-but was not sub-
stantively changed, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.606 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992); changing
Rule 608 to expand the ability to impeach, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.608 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1992); changing Rule 616 to provide for the removal of a witness from the
courtroom to prevent overhearing other testimony, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.616 (West
1979 & Supp. 1992); amending Rule 803(19) to modernize the language replacing
the term "legitimacy" with "parentage", FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.803 (West 1979 &
Supp. 1992); and changing Rule 804(c) to remove the ban previously imposed on
the use of a co-defendants statement to inculcate, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.804 (West
1979 & Supp. 1992).
357. Oregon amended Rule 511 to limit the counselor-client privilege by al-
lowing the client or the one responsible for him to waive the privilege, OR. REV.
STAT. § 40.280 (1991); Rule 503 (lawyer-client privilege) was amended by altering
the definition of a representative of the client, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.225 (1991); Rule
504 was amended to limit application of the psychotherapist-patient privilege;
Rule 504(1) made the same adjustment to the physician-patient privilege; Rule
504(4) was amended to further restrict a prior limitation on the social-worker-cli-
ent privilege, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.230 (1991); Rule 505 was amended to abolish the
husband-wife privilege where the husband and wife are adverse parties in a civil
proceeding, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.255 (1991); Rule 604 was amended to change the
word handicapped to disabled, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.320 (1991); Rule 606(1), which
was entitled competency ofAttorney as Witness, was repealed, Or. Laws 1987, ch.
352 § 1 (June 22, 1987); Rule 609 was amended by the Crime Victim's Bill of
Rights, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.335 (1991); Rule 613 was amended to correct a double
negative in the provision, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.380 (1991); Rule 615 was amended
by the Crime Victim's Bill of Rights, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.485 (1991); Rule 801 was
amended to add a statement made at a deposition to the list of non-hearsay state-
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number of amendments, but that is not the whole story.
Although both of the states with no amendments recently
adopted their codes and Nevada, the state with the most
amendments, has the oldest codification,358 the state with the
second oldest code, Arkansas, which adopted its cod~ immedi-
ately after the Federal Rules were adopted in 1976, has only
amended one of its code's provisions.359 Oklahoma and Ne-
braska, the states with the next most senior codes, show only
four and six amendments respectively.360
Even the experience in Nevada, which has amended provi-
sions of its law at least 106 times,361 provides no support for
opponents' fear of politicization. The amendments to the Ne-
vada Evidence Code suggest not that Nevada has a runaway or
reactionary legislature, but rather that Nevada has an ineffi-
cient legislature. Indeed, most of these changes have been mi-
nor and do not adversely effect criminal defendants.362 For
instance, while one section was amended nine times, only one
substantive change was made to permit a chemical expert in a
drug case to testify by affidavit to the chemical analysis of
drugs. Two of these efforts were addressed to this substantive
change; the remaining seven made grammatical corrections.363
There is not a single amendment in Nevada that seems to be
ments, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.450 (1991); Rule 803 was amended to add a hearsay
exception for a child victim of sexual assault, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.480 (1991); Rule
1005 was amended to expand the circumstances under which a public record satis-
fied the best evidence rule, OR. REV. STAT. § 40.570 (1991).
358. Nevada was so anxious to codify that it based its code on the Preliminary
Draft of the Federal Rules. Act of Apr. 22, 1971, ch. 402, 1971 Nev. Stat. 775.
359. See supra note 353.
360. See supra notes 354 & 356.
361. NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 47.020-52.395 (1979 & Supp. 1991).
362. See, e.g., id. § 47.140 (Judicial Notice of Law) (which has been amended
three times). In 1973, it was amended to include judicial notice of municipal codes;
in 1977, it was amended to correct a change of name of a referenced provision; in
1985 it was amended to permit judicial notice of Nevada Administrative code and
regulations.
363. In 1975, paragraphs two and three were added to section 50.315 which
provides for the admissibility of an affidavit from chemical experts testifying in a
drug case. Act of May 13, 1975, ch. 431, 1975 Nev. Stat. 647. This amendment
was amplified in 1983 to define more clearly what information was admissible. Act
of May 29, 1983, ch. 594, 1983 Nev. Stat. 1914. Other amendments to section
50.315 have been limited to changes in grammar or punctuation. See Act of Apr.
25,1973, ch. 555, 1973 Nev. Stat. 891; Act ofJune 8,1987, ch. 352, 1987 Nev. Stat,
798, and Act of June 18, 1987, ch. 658, 1987 Nev. Stat. 1544.
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the product of public pressure in response to a particular ver-
dict. Further, none of the Nevada Code changes are very differ-
ent from developments in other states by either the statutory or
common law process.
Looking to the substance of the amendments in all ten
states further suggests that the politicization fear is unfounded.
Most of the amendments have been technical changes, such as
gender,364 or minor, neutral changes, such as expanding the def-
inition of the doctor-patient privilege to include psychologists
and social workers.365 Some of the changes have even favored
defendants. Florida, which had not originally adopted Federal
Rule 404(a)(2) (permitting the defendant to offer evidence of a
pertinent trait of character of a crime victim), amended its law
in 1990 to permit such evidence.366 This is not to say that the
prosecution has had no success. Notably, almost every state
has adopted statutes that make communications between rape
victims and their counselors privileged367 and many have ex-
panded the admissibility of child/victim testimony.368 However,
the pressure to make these particular changes is intense and
similar changes have been made in uncodified states by both
courts and legislatures.369 There is simply no way to guarantee
that the legislature will not enact rules that help prosecutors
and hinder criminal defendants. Whether such rules help or
harm society is another question. Whether a state has a code of
evidence simply does not determine the outcome of this process.
The experience in most codified jurisdictions, particularly
those modeled after the Federal Rules, is just the reverse. It
364. See supra note 353.
365. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West 1979 & Supp. 1992).
366. [d. § 90.404.
367. See, e.g., id. § 90.5035.
368. See, e.g., ARK. R. EVID. 803(25) (Michie 1992); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 90.803(23) (West 1979 & Supp. 1992). lllinois, one of the seven remaining com-
mon law states, adopted a statute specifically to admit this testimony and the TIli-
nois Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the provision. ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 115-10 (1989); People v. Rocha, 547 N.E.2d 1335 (TIl. App. Ct. 1989).
369. The New York legislature created a similar pro-victim statute in 1990
after model Marla Hansen was brutally slashed across the fact and was later con-
fronted with extraordinarily intrusive questioning during the trial ofher assailant.
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAw § 60.43 (McKinney 1992). See Kevin Sack, New York Limits
Use of Sex History in Trials, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1990, at B3. The fact that New
York had not codified its law of evidence did not stop the legislature from acting in
this instance.
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may be that New York legislature is more likely than others to
react to public opinion. It may be that the history of codification
in the states is too short to predict confidently the legislative
response to codification over the long run. However, these pre-
liminary results do not suggest that codification of the law of
evidence will result in frequent, politically motivated, legisla-
tive changes. The fear ofemotional legislative responses should
not control the decision to codify since legislatures will respond
to public outcry whether or not the law of evidence is codified.
Conclusion
The battle to codify New York's law of evidence is certainly
not over. Codification can improve the quality ofevidentiary ar-
guments and unify the law within the state. The current propo-
sal, although essentially a codification of existing common law,
does modernize and clarify a number of evidentiary rules. Codi-
fication will not limit judicial development of the law of evi-
dence. Moreover, it seems unlikely that the political process
will produce the havoc that opponents predict. The worst fears
of those opposed to the proposed New York code will not come to
pass; their clients will not be thrown to the mercies of a hostile
legislature that will decree more and more bad evidence law. In
other states those fears, by and large, have not been realized in
fifteen years of experience with codification of the national law
of evidence.
Furthermore, opponents of the code are winning a costly
pyrrhic victory. Even without a New York code, there is no pure
New York common law of evidence. To the contrary, the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence are fast becoming New York common law
by osmosis. The defense bar may find that it can more effec-
tively stem the perceived shift toward admissibility by joining
the process of drafting a code for New York. The result of this
effort will leave the defense bar better off in the war than in
winning the current battle.
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